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ABSTRACT
An area closely tied to Mexico by geography, conmerce, and
culture, South Texas has been strongly affected by the recent Mexican
currency devaluation. Although the area had experienced a rapid
growth in recent years, its unbalanced economy will be strained by
the devaluation' s effects.
The analysis in this thesis is divided into two parts. Part
One examines the effects of the devaluation on specific sectors of
the region's economy: retail industry, financial institutions, and
government income-maintenance programs. The study shows the reaction
of the parties most affected and reviews business policy changes that
subsequently took place. A basic premise that underlies this part of
the analysis is that by examining the economy before and after such
a severe' econonic impact, those sectors of the economy sensitive to
changes can be observed more readily. More important, their roles in
the economy can be studied and policy suggestions to improve the area' s
economy determined.
Part Two of the thesis examines the policy issues raised by the
devaluation's impact, and attempts to understand the implications of
that impact on the development of the region. Three specific issues
examined are: economic development strategies, U.S. immnigration policy
with respect to the cormuter, and illegal immigration from Mexico. The
applicability of the assumptions of the Economic Development Administration' s
development strategy to the area is examined and criticized in light of
the devaluation's effects on the three issues above. The final chapter
proposes alternative strategies that deal with the limitations of development
policies currently implemented by the Economic Development Administration.
Emphasis is placed on utilizing the area's own resources. Thus, major
consideration is given to the role the agriculture industry, local govern-
ments, and rural organizations might play in the area's development.
Thesis Supervisor: Karen Polenske
Associate Professor, Regional Planning
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INTRODUCTION
On August 31, 1976, the government of Mexico announced
its decision to float the peso. By choosing such a course,
the government ended both its currency's association with
the U.S. dollar and a 22-year-old exchange rate of 12.5 pesos
to the U.S. dollar. To prevent currency speculation, the
Mexican government announced that the Bank of Mexico would
intervene in the exchange market to keep the peso's value
within some reasonable limits. The following day, in his
last State of the Union address, President Luis Echeverria
explained his government's policy decision by discussing the
need for parity with the U.S. dollar and the need and objectives
of the devaluation. [See Appendix I for excerpts from his
State of the Union address] Echeverria, maintained that the
peso's association with the U.S. dollar was required so that
foreign credit and financing could be obtained for Mexico's
public investment program. He noted that during his adminis-
tration, public investment had surpassed private investment
for the first time.1 Yet, it was this public investment pattern
that later led to a deficit in Mexico's balance of payments
and thus precipitated the peso's devaluation.
Before the devaluation, efforts were made to enlarge the
payment capacity of foreign borrowings by increasing domestic
production of Mexican exports. However, at the same time, world
economic conditions were reducing demand for Mexican goods.
As a result of this decreased demand and Mexico's increasing
6
propensity to import foreign goods, a trade deficit began to
mount. Mexico responded to this trade deficit with several
measures. Exports were bolstered through a duty-rebate mechanism,
special financing and guarantees. While institutional sales
promotion efforts were made in many countries, strict import
controls were applied. However, Mexico's "export dynamism"
did not sufficiently respond to these measures. Not until
negative trade flows became apparent, domestic price levels
increased relative to those abroad, an unused production capacity
was verified, did Mexican policymakers conclude that the
country's rate of currency exchange needed to be altered.2
With this, Mexico devalued its currency. The objectives
of the devaluation were announced: promote export growth, cur-
tail the importation of foreign goods, and reduce Mexico's
need to borrow abroad. The Administration also announced
several restrictions of import-export companies and retail
merchants. Concern over wheather domestic prices would rise
and affect the purchasing power of low-income groups led to
precautions in this regard. Despite the economic and financial
strategies devised by the Echeverria administration to minimize
the unfavorable consequences, not all policy actions have met
with success. Since the devaluation, news accounts have re-
3
ported union pressure for wage hikes, poorly regulated price
control-measures, a period of capital flight and subsequently,
a second currency devaluation on October 27, 1976.
7.
PU'POSE OF THESIS
Although the post-devaluation experience in Mexico
raises issues of importance and concern as to the directions
of Mexico's future economic policy, this study will
not undertake such a comprehensive investigation. Rather,
this study's objective is to provide a general framework
for understanding the direct and indirect effects of the
Mexican currency devaluation along the U.S. side of the
U.S.-Mexico border.
The thesis is divided into two parts. First, we examine
the effects of the devaluation on specific sectors of the re-
gion's economy. Second, in an attempt to understand the impli-
cations of the devaluation's impact on the development of the
region, we briefly examine the specific policy issues the
impact raises and the conflicts in the present development
strategies. This questioning leads to an initial examination
of some alternative strategies for the area. There is a basic
premise that underlies the analysis of the devaluation; that
is, that by examining the economy before and after such a severe
impact occurred, those sectors of the economy sensitive to
changes can be observed more readily. More importantly, their
roles in the economy can be studied and policy suggestions to
improve the area's economy determined. In addition, Part 2
provides a beginning for future work in the region by the
author.
Part One- Impact Analysis of Two Border Communities
Part One of the thesis (Chapters 1 to 4), provides an over-
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view of the Lower Rio Grande Valley region and then a specific
analysis of the effects of the August 31,1976 Mexican currency
devaluation on two U.S. towns situated along the Mexican
border. Using employment and sales data from the wholesale-
retail sectors, data on deposits from commercial banks and
savings and loans, information from two state-operated income
maintenance programs, and interviews with representatives from
the above sectors, the study shows the reaction of the parties
most affected and reviews the policy changes that subsequently
took place. The analysis examines questions such as: the short-
term strategies of business firms, the type of workers affected
by the devaluation's impact, and the reasons why the devaluation
affected the area so severely, i.e., what policies caused the
area to grow the way it did.
Although there are many communities along the 1800 mile
U.S.-Mexico border, not all the communities could be examined
in this study. Therefore, it must be noted that the analysis
of South Texas is actually derived from data on only two of the
many communities located there, McAllen and Brownsville.
These two cities were selected for several reasons. First,
both cities are situated in the South Texas region. Secondly,
the author was familiar with officials and interviews were
easy to obtain. In addition, the two cities are within commuting
distance of each other, allowing time and funding constraints
to be fulfilled. Almost all of the information in the first
part of the thesis will therefore relate to those two cities.
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A major concern is that the reader recognize the differences
existing among the economies of the various border cities.
For example, this study focuses on the Lower Rio Grande
Valley, an area with a large agricultural employment base,
(13% in 1974). In contrast, El Paso and Laredo, also Texas
border cities, have large manufacturing (20%) and retail (36%)
6
employment bases, respectively. These differences should
have some influence on the devaluation's impact on each
city's economy. Still, there are many similarities among
the border region's communities, and therefore many of the
general findings of this paper are relevant to all the
communities.
Part Two- Overall Regional Development Issues for the Lower
Rio Grande Valley
In an attempt to understand the implications of the
devaluation's impact on the development of the region, part 2
(chapters 5 to 7) of the thesis examines the specific policy
issues raised by the devaluation and the conflicts in present
development strategies.
In Chapter 5, the three specific policy issues raised
by the devaluation are discussed: post-devaluation development
strategies, U.S. immigration~ policy with respect to the commuter,
and illegal immigration from Mexico. These issues become
important because the devaluation has, in effect, depressed
the economy of the South Texas border region and created
pressures on Mexican laborers to migrate into the United States.
Specifically, the major policy questions raised by the Mexican
10
currency devaluation for American border cities are:
A. What direction should post-devaluation economic
development strategies take?
1. Since retail businesses have generated the
largest employment gains in the area and are
the hardest hit by the devaluation should they
qualify for low-interest loans from the Small
Business Administration? Will subsidizing
these businesses minimize employment losses?
Will employment losses increase pressures for
outward migration by border residents?
2. What is the possible role of city and county
governments and financial institutions in
development matters? How have they been af-
fected by the devaluation?
3. What are the present strategies of the Economic
Development Administration, the Department of
Agriculture, and the Department of Labor in the
area?
B. U.S. Immigration Policy along the border
1. What will federal policy dictate in regard to the
Mexican commuter?
2. What recent proposals have been offered to change
this situation?
3. How will development affect these proposals?
C. Illegal Immigration from Mexico
1. Will the economic consequences of the devaluation
increase the flow of Mexican alien labor into the
U.S., specifically along the border?
2. Are illegal aliens a problem along the border?
3. How do illegal aliens affect development along the
border?
4. What immigration policies have been proposed and
what should be?
These issues are examined in Chapter 5 within the context
of the general economic development of the area. In this set-
ting different policy strategies are discussed in order to
examine their adaptability and usefulness to the area, Present
11
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development strategies implemented in the area before the
devaluation are challenged, using the ideas and research of
Marshall, Briggs, and Hansen. The author also utilizes the
writings of such regional development theorists as Cameron,
and Hirschman, and knowledgeable sources on Mexican migration
into the United States as Cornelius and North.
In Chapter 6, the limitations of present development
strategies, as highlighted by the devaluation, are pointed
out, and alternative strategies that make use of local
resourdes are proposed in Chapter 7. These alternative
strategies consider the roles that the agriculture industry,
local government, and rural organizations might play in the
area. Thus, the devaluation's effect illustrates the need
for new development strategies suited to the area's social
and economic resources. A discussion of these alternatives
will conclude Part 2.
FORMAT OF THESIS
Chapter One provides an introduction to the Lower Rio
Grande Valley region. A geograhic description of the area
is given, as well as the general socio-economic characteristics
of the population. Although the description focuses on the
McAllen-Pharr-Edinburg SMSA, most of the discussion can also
be extended to the Brownsville SMSA. The chapter concludes
with a brief historical account of U.S.-Mexico border develop-
ment; focusing on the close association between border communities
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and why the currency devaluation will affect both sides of
the border.
Chapter Two examines employment gains in the area's
retail sector from 1971-1975. It also examines the business
reaction of retailers to the devaluation, including employ-
ment cutbacks and other changes in business operation fol-
lowing the devaluation. In addition, several factors that
affected the adjustment of business operations are discussed.
Chapter Three discusses the policy changes made by
financial institutions (i.e., commercial banks and savings
and loans) during the adjustment period. Because early news
accounts after the devaluation reported a large capital out-
flow from Mexico, this chapter examines the amount and in-
vestment of that money in the region. The discussion closes
by examining the role of these institutions in economic
development efforts.
Chapter Four discusses the impact of devaluation on state
programs such as the Unemployment Insurance Program, and the
Texas Department of Welfare's Food Stamp Program, These pro-
grams are examined in order to estimate employment losses and
illustrate the magnitude of participation in these income
maintenance programs.
Chapter Five examines the major issues raised by the
devaluation and why concern over these issues is justified.
Also reviewed are past policy responses and present policy
proposals as they concern the issues of illegal migration from
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Mexico, the Mexican commuter, and economic development along
the border.
Chapter Six reviews the general assumptions underlying
the theory of planned adjustment and the theory of national
demand. The former theory is the rationale for present
federal investment in depressed regions of the country. The
theory's approach to the region's problems is examined
from the points of view of alternative policy strategies
such as investment in human resources and investment in fast-
growing regions; while the theory of national demand is further
explained by reviewing the theory of comparative cost.
Finally the limitations of these strategies in the region
are pointed out.
Chapter Seven concludes the analysis by suggesting al-
ternative development strategies that involve the agriculture
industry, local governments, and rural organizations. The
suitability and benefits of these approaches are discussed.
PART ONE
IMPACT ANALYSIS OF TWO BORDER COMMUNITIES
Part One of the thesis (chapters 1 to 4) provides an
overview of the Lower Rio Grande Valley and then a specific
analysis of the effects of the August 31, 1976 Mexican
currency devaluation on two U.S. towns situtated on the
Mexican border. It must be pointed out that there is a definition
problem between the term rural area and the term Standard
Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) within this analysis.
Although the analysis focuses on the Brownsville and McAllen
SMSAs, the area is predominantly rural, if a rural area can
be defined as having a farm population and work force that
comprises a significant proportion of the total labor force.
This urban-rural dichotomy should be kept in mind by the
reader, especially since the analysis focuses on the urban
aspects of the metropolitan area.
15
CHAPTER ONE
THE LOWER RIO GRANDE VALLEY
This case study examines the effects of the Mexican currency
devaluation on two conmunities located in the Lower Rio Grande Valley;
McAllen and Brownsville, Texas. The Lower Rio Grande Valley is generally
considered to include the three southernmost counties of Texas: Hidalgo,
Cameron, and Willacy counties. The total estimated 1973 population of these
three counties is 381,000. Two cities, Brownsville and McAllen, lead
the region in population, [To avoid confusion, Hidalgo county is
designated as the McAllen-Pharr-Edinburg SMSA and Caneron county is
designated as the Brownsville-Harlingen-San Benito SMSA], but the majority
of the region' s population is found in smaller cities, most of which
are located along U.S. Highway 83. (See Map)
Located on an old river basin, the Valley contains 3,452 square
miles, much of it very good farm land. Irrigation is provided by the
Rio Grande River. The region is bordered to the east by the Gulf of
Mexico and to the south by the Rio Grande River.
Ports, air terminals, rail and two major highways service the area.
According to the Lower Rio Grande Development Council 7 , the region has the
land, manpower, and energy to accommodate new' indu'stiies' if 'the prbblem of
ready accessibility to markets can be overcame.8 The closest city of
substantial size is Corpus Christi, ~130 miles away. Two other major markets
are San Antonio and Houston, the nearest being over 200 miles away.
The Valley is dominated by agriculture. Table 1 presents data on
total agricultural employmnt in the area, both permanent and seasonal. As
16
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seen fron column 5, the area does have a large seasonal wotk force
9consisting largely of illegal aliens , and migrant fanrmworkers.
TABLE 1
Counties Operators Regular
Cameron 965 1080
Hidalgo 2900 2000
Willacy 220 390
Total 4085 3470
Source::Texas Eanployrrent Cc-nission,
15, 1974." Austin, Texas.
Seasonal as %
Seasonal Total of Total
2600 4645 56%
5155 10055 51%
620 1230 50%
8375 15930
"Total Agricultural Eploymaent, October
Second most important to the Valley's economy is the tourist
industry. Many tourists, attracted by the Valley's proximity to Mexico
and its mild winters, have become winter residents in the area, and this
number continues to grow yearly. 1 0
The Valley -contains small, light industries but few heavy industrial
manufacturing plants. Most of the industries are located in the three
largest cities, Brownsville, McAllen, and Harlingen. These industries
generally are agricultural-related, but garment manufacturing and shrimping
also are situated in the area. 11
McAllen, Texas (Hidalgo County)
Within Hidalgo County, McAllen (population of 44,343) is centrally
located and because of its location, plays an important role in the
county econamy. Its Mexican counterpart is Reynosa, Tamaulipas, a Mexican
border industrial town five miles away, with a population estimated at
over 150,000 (1970). McAllen is surrounded by a number of smaller cities
such as Hidalgo (1435), Mission (14781), Pharr (17343), Edinburg (19,426),
18
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San Juan (6535) , Alamo (4736), Donna (8445), Weslaco (18447), and
Mercedes (9815). The most distant of these mentioned cities is Mercedes,
approximately 25 miles away. Other cities, such as Pharr and .San Juan,
have adjoining city limits to McAllen.
The 1970 Census of Population reported 181,534 persons
and 38,122 families residing in the McAllen-Pharr-Edinburg SMSA, Of
this number, 79.1 percent were Spanish surnamed individuals. In 1960,
the Census reported a population of 180,900. Although the population
grew little during this 10-year period, its population characteristics
changed greatly, as the area experienced an out-migration of Anglo-Americans
and a continued increase in the numrber of Spanish-surnamed Aericans.
A study sponsored by the Council for South Texas Economic Progress
showed that in 21 border counties of South Texas, (including Hidalgo and
Caneron counties), 40-45 percent of Anglo residents between the ages of
20-49 left the region during the 1960-1970 period. Among Spanish-surnamed
Americans of com-parable ages, approximately 35 percent left the region
without replacement. Older age groups experienced no substantial changes
during this period. 1 2
Most recent population estimates show a sharp increase over the
1970 figure for Hidalgo county. The increase in population is estimated
at 25,000 for the county and 6,700 for McAllen (44,343).13
Personal income is very low in Hidalgo county. In 1970, out of
233 SMSAs in the United States, the McAllen -Pharr-Edinburg Smsa held the
distinction of ranking last. The Brownsville-Harlingen-San Benito
SMSA ranked above the McAllen SMSA with its per capita income of $2,126.
And the third lowest ranking belonged to another border SSA\, Laredo (Webb
County) . 14 Per capita income averaged $2, 214 in that county. As of 1973,
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per capita income had increased somewhat in all three SMSAs but had not
reached $3000.15
A comparative study of Spanish-surnamed and Anglo family incomes
reveals a large discrepancy by group, as presented in Table 2. Median
family incomes for Spanish-surnamed families arounted to $3,958, while
Anglo median family incomes reached $8,851; a difference of over 100
percent.
TABLE 2
GROUP DIFFERENCES IN FAMILY INCOME (1969)
McAllen-Pharr-Edinburg SMSA (Hidalgo County)
Family Income Spanish-surnamed Anglos Total Texas
Under $5,000 62.3% 26.1% 52.3% 25,6%
Under $10,000 89.5% 56.4% 80.3% 60.0%
Median $3,958 $8,851 $5,216 $8,490
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Population, 1970: General Social
and Economic Characteristics. Table 89, p.45-590 and Table 100, p.45-728
Such family incame data underscores another problem in Hidalgo county;
the county derives income fram farm activities at three times the state
average, while manufacturing plays only a small part in the county economy.
Government continues to be a dominant source of income in wage and salary
payments and in "transfer payments" in the form of welfare, Social security,
unemployment compensation, and farm subsidies. 1 6
Educational attainment of the county population is low in comparison
to state and national averages. Table 3 presents data on the number of
school years completed by persons 25 years and older in Hidalgo county. In
all cases, the data report Spanish-surnamed individuals as lagging behind
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TABLE -3
YEARS OF SCHOOL COMPLETED AMONG PERSONS 25 YEARS AND OLDER
MCALLEN-PHARR-EDINBURG SMSA (HIDALGO COUNTY)
YEAR ANGLOS SSAs TOTAL TEXAS
NONE 1.6 20.7 16.5 3.0
1-7 11.4 49.7 36.6 19.0
8-11 24.6 13.2 16.6 30.6
12 28.9 9.8 15.6 25.1
13 Or More 33.5 6.6 14.7 22.3
Median Years 12.0 5.0 7.3 11.6
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Population. 1970:
General and Social Chararcterstics, p. 45-507, ip, 4 5 - 6 8 .
Anglos in the number of school years completed. Median school years
completed by Spanish-surmaned Americans in the county measured 5.0
years compared with 12.0 years for Anglos.1 7
Employment in Hidalgo county is heavily based on the agricul-
tural, trade, and service industries. Labor force estimates place the
county's labor force at 79,360 for December, 1976.18
occupational percentage breakdowns for Hidalgo county listed in
1970 U.S. Census of Population show the clerical fields claim the highest
percentage of workers (17), followed closely by service workers,
excluding private household, (12), and machine operators (11). Table 4
presents this information for Hidalgo county. 19
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TABLE 4
OCCUPATIONS OF EMPLOYED PERSONS OVER THE AGE OF 16
FOR THE McALLEN-PHARR-EDINBURG SMSA
OCCUPATION
Professional, technical,
kindred workers
Managers & Administrators
except farms
Sales workers
Clerical and kindred
workers
Craftsmen, Foremen,
kindred workers
Operatives, except transport
Transport equipment operatives
Laborers, except farm
Farmers and farm managers
Farm laborers, farm foremen
Service workers, except
private household
Private Household workers
Total
NUMBER OF WORKERS
5, 4.35
3,368
3,518
6,548
2,791
4,286
1,603
1,908
409
2,543
4,548
1,268
38,225
% OF TOTAL
14
9
9
17
7
11
4
5
1
9
12
3
99
SOURCt: U.S.CENSUS OF THE BUREAU. CENSUS OF POPULATION 1970: GENERAL
AND SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS, Table 86, p. 45-551
22
Brwnsville, Texas (Cameron County)
The Brownsville SMSA exhibits many of the same characteristics as
the McAllen-Pharr-Edinburg SMSA in regard to population, income, educa-
tion, and labor force. However, two basic differences should be nentioned.
Firgt, Brownsville is located alongside a fair-sized Mexican border
city, Tamaulipas (250, 000). As such, the interaction between the two
cities is more pronounced than that between McAllen and Reynosa.
Similarly, Brownsville's location is not central to the county economy
as is McAllen's.
In addition, Brownsville has experienced a growth in the number of
industrial firms over the 1970-1975 periodwith 70 new firms opening
20
since 1970; and 2000 new industrial jobs announced in 19752. This rate
of industrial growth surpasses that of any other city in the region. Those
industries locating represent products and services that include electronic/
electrical firms, passenger buses, offshore dirilling platforms, drilling
rigs, fiberglass swiming pool equipment, paper and plastic shopping
bags, toys, collapsable bleachers, shrimp trawlers, corrugated boxes,
ores, appliances, plastic injected products, autamotive coponents, oil
field drill bits, construction and mining equipment, precision drill bits,
fire arms, apparel, seafood, ships, barges, and railroad cars.21
HISTORICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Under the terms of the 1848 Treaty of Guadelupe-Hidalgo, Mexico
surrendered large amounts of territories to the United States. This treaty
also established the present political boundaries between the two countries.
The Rio Grande i1er proved a clear and natural boundary for the
area from Brownsville to EL Saso. West of El Paso, argumnts were raised
23
I.
by both countries as to the correct boundary lines. This issue was ulti-
mately settled by negotiation and resulted in the "Gadsden Purchase"
22
of 18532.
Although borders are designed to impede the flow of cammerce - and
the movement of people, such was not the case along the U.S.-Mexico
border for many years. Unrestricted movement by residents of both sides
was normal and frecuent. Not until the Inrigration Act of 1924 was the
border officially closed. The Act also provided for the establishment of
the Border Patrol and made it a felony charge for anyone to enter the
United States illegally. 2 3 Despite these actions, migration from Mexico
persisted.
The violence of the Mexican Revolutionary War ccbined with U.S.
labor shortages resulting from World War I to inspire the first significant
Mexican migration of 1910-1919. 24 The type of industry located in the
Southwest also contributed to migration. Agriculture, ranching, and
mining dominated the early industrial base of the Southwest. These
industries, highly labor-intensive and therefore magnets for attracting
migrant labor, sought to tap a variety of low-wage, unskilled, and legzally
unprotected workers. 2 5
An official sanction for such worker imports came in the 1940s
when U.S. agnicultural growers, citing labor shortages caused this time
by World War II, requested a contract labor program with Mexico.
After initial repudiations fram both governments, an agreement was reached
in August, 1942. Called the Mexican Labor Program, the plan was better
known as the Bracero Program. Under terms of the agreement Mexican workers
24
in the United States could only be employed in agricultural activities.
Any Mexican worker found in same other employment became subject to
deportation. 2 6
The program initially offered participants protection in regard
to housing, transportation, food, redical needs, and wage rates.
However, by 1943, Mexico banned its workers from participating in the
Bracero Program in Texas, citing abusive and discriminatory treatment
as its reason. 2 7 The initial agreeent ended in 1947, but practice
continued both informally and by law (P.L. 78-1952) until it was finally
terminated by the United States in 1964. 28 The consequence of this pro-
ram, as Briggs contends, was to attract to the Mexican border towns
fopret.program participants, who subsequently became illegal entrants. 2 9
Following the Bracero Program's termination in 1964, Mexico
began to examine methods by which to adjust to the new situation.
The migration of Mexican laborers to Mexican border towns, magnified by
the labor contract program created significant population increases in
Mexican border towns. Adtj to these growth-induced problems were
the unemployed Braceros who made the labor situation more severe. 30
Mexico responded by forming the Border Industrial Program (La
Prograrna de Industrializacion Fronterizo) in 1965. This proqram, still
in effect, attempts to take advantage of U.S. tariff codes, which
allow U.S.-owned foreign-based subsidiaries to assemble products fram
parts manufactured in the United States. Before beginning the program,
the Mexican government made legal nodifications on the operation and
taxation of foreign firms within Mexico. 3 1 Not until 1966, following
the establishment of a 12.5 mile wide, free trade zone along the entire
25
U.S. -Mexico border, did the program begin. Progress was slow, but by
1972, 345 plants were participating in the program with a total employ-
went of 46,000.32 Recently, the program has encountered some difficulties.
For example, although the program was conceived to meet the needs of
unemployed males (i.e., braceros) , the nature of the assenbly work is
such that between 80 and 90 percent of the Mexican employees to date,
33
are women, between 18 and 24 yearssof age . Secondly, wages to Mexican
workers in these plants have increased tremendously. These wage hikes,
regulated by the National Cammission on Minimum Wages, have caused many
firms to reevaluate their participation in the program.34
Mexico has attempted to reduce its dependency on the U.S. economy.
The National Frontier Program established in 1960 sought to diversify
the economy of Mexico's northern states. The Border Industrial Program
attempted to introduce a backward linkage with those American assembly
plants locating along the border.35
And in 1971, the Echeverria administration founded the Interminis-
terial Conmission for the Economic Developnent of the Border Zone.
This Cammission's objectives are: to reduce the import of popular con-
sumption items from the United States into Mexico; to improve municipal
infrastructure in Mexican border towns; to help establish nedium and
small industries for the production of import substitutes to supply
local, regional, and national markets; and to develop new agricultural
and livestock activities.36
Possibly the most relevant policy to examine in order to gain an
understanding of the American-Mexican border situation, is present U.S.
inmigration policy regarding Mexico. Anerican border immigration policy
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contributes to the close ties between U.S.-Mexican border commnities.
For many years, the process of admitting legal inmigrants (green carders)
and commuters (white carders) into the United States has been relatively
unobstructed. For exanple, consider the case of the conmuter.
As "legal visitors", camuters can remain a maximum of 72 hours
within a 25-mile radius of the border; but they cannot seek employment
during their stay. However, since the cards bear no date indicating when
the conruter crosses the border, there is no way to know how long or how
many individuals have been issued cards, or more importantly, how they are
employed. As Briggs states, the white cards have become de facto work
permits for thousands of conmuting Mexicans. 37
SUMMARY
As this chapter shows, there have been programs initiated by
both governents that have fostered the close association between U.S.-
Mexican border ccmmunities. At present, some of these programs and
policies are still in effect. Chapter One, has attempted to show
the reasons behind this close association between border cormunities,
and why the currency devaluation will affect both sides of the border.
Chapter 'Iwo continues the analysis by focusing on the most observable
impacted area, retail business.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE DEVALUATION'S IMPACT ON THE RETAIL-WHOLESALE SECTORS
In this chapter, the devaluation's effect on the retail
industry of the Brownsville and McAllen SMSAs is examined. A
brief discussion of the history of retail activity in the
Valley; specifically the 1971-1975 period provides a frame-
work for understanding the reasons behind the wholesale-
retail sector's growth during that time. Employment and sales
data from 1971-1975 are examined in order to document the
employment gains made during this period.
Development in the retail-wholesale sectors has not
been aided by any U.S. development policy. Rather, the
growth is a reaction to the market advantage created by
Mexican currency policies. An evaluation of the wholesale-
retail growth is therefore made to pinpoint the products
most often purchased by Mexican consumers, thus defining
the wholesale-retail divisions in which the devaluation's
impact should have been most obvious. Next, interviews with af-
fected border retail merchants are used to illustrate their
reaction to the devaluation and subsequent attempts to mini-
mize all costs during the period following. Findings from
the interviews will also illustrate which businesses were most
affected by the devaluation, and determine the effectiveness
of federal assistance in minimizing employment losses. Other
considerations that led to the analysis of these particular
sectors are explained below.
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The retail industry in the Valley region has always dom-
inated economic activity. Large employment gains were made
during the period of 1971-1976, especially within a sector that
mainly employs low-skilled labor. This new employment suited
the region because of the population's limited training and ed-
uactional experience. Many employment opportunities resulted
from this expansion. During this period, the employed labor force
increased dramactically, while food stamp participation slowly
dropped. 3 8
Retail firms found the region profitable for several reasons.
For one, retail firms enjoyed a Mexican market much larger than
their local markets. In addition, Mexico's population was be-
coming more urbanized, especially along their border, and demand
for popular consumption goods mounted. As real income increased
during this period, it was reflected by increased sales. More
importantly, Mexican economic policies contributed to the growing
number of Mexican consumers along border retail markets. Inflation
measured by the Mexican consumer price index averaged a 16 percent
increase per year during the 1971-1975 period,39 Thus, as the
Mexican peso's purchasing power decreased domestically, its fixed
parity with the U.S. dollar maintained its purchasing power abroad.
This was the major reason for the retail sector's growth during
the 1971-1976 period.
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Since this sector's rapid growth has been curtailed, it is
apprcpriate to examine retailer's reactions to the Mexican currency
devaluation. First, however, an explanation of the collection process
for the data used in the analysis of retail reaction is needed.
Employment and Sales Data
Prior to interviews with local businessmen, an attempt was made
to collect enployment data on a disaggregated basis by retail division.
Employment information was not available in the described form. However,
data available fra the Texas Employment Canmission did provide covered
enployment by industry. Table 5 depicts this information for 1971
and 1975. Covered employment refers to those employees covered under the
Texas Unemployment Act of 1972. Although this Act does not cover
all workers, the informaticn provided a basis on which to examine
enplcymrent gains over the five-year period.
During the 1971-1975 period, within the McAllen-Pharr-Edinburg
SMSA, the largest absolute enploynent gains were experienced in the whole-
sale-retail and service sectors. Employment in the wholesale-retail
sectors grew by 5755 workers, while service employmrent increased by
4724. These two industries accounted for 57 percent of the net increase
over this period.
During the same period, Brownsville experienced its major employment
gains in the retail-wholesale (4345), manufacturing (4751), and service
(3590) sectors. These absolute increases represented 77 percent of the
covered employment gains over the period.
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TABLE 5
MCALLEN-PHARR-EDINBURG SMSA (HIDALGO COUNTY)
COVERED EMPLOYMENT
% of 1975'09L
MINING
CONSTRUCTION
MANUFACTURING
TRANSPORTATION
WHOLESALE &
RETAIL
FIN. , INS. &
REAL ESTATE
SERVICES
STATE GOVERN.
FEDERAL GOVERN.
744
1785
3639
1487
3.3
7.9
16.1
6.6
10508 46.3
935
2539.-
N.A.
1033
4.1
ll.2
N.A.
4.6
948
3335
5506
2128
2.3
8.1
13.4
5.2
16263 40.4
1665 4.0
7263 18.0
2668 6.0
1351 3.0
TOTAL 22670 100.1 41127100.4 51160 52870
BROWNSVILLE-HARLINGEN-SAN BENITO (CAMERON COUNTY)
COVERED EMPLYMENT
INDUSTRY 1971 TMrI 1975 'OL SEPT. 76 DEC. 76
MINING
CONSTRUCTION
MANUFACTURING,
TRANSPORTATION
WHOLESALE &
RETAIL
FIN., INS. &
REAL ESTATE
SERVICES
STATE GOVERN.
FEDERAL GOVERN.
83
1784
5358
2467
.3
7.0
22.0
10.0
8979 37.0
1184
3383
N.A.
782
TOTALLT 24020
5.0
14.0
N.A.
3.0
55
2642
9703
2612
.1
7.0
24.0
6.0
13730 34.0
2536
6973
1521
795
6.0
17.0
4.0
2.0
98 3 40567 100.1
1Calculated by using quarterly averages of county covered enployrrent figures.
Source: Texas Employment Conission, Covered Employment and Wages, Austin, Texas
1971-1975.
2 Nnagricultural Wage and Salary Estimates & Forecasts. Source: Texas Employment
Conuission, Manpower Trends. Austin, Texas. January 1977.
N.A.= not available
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INTh1 SEPT. 76 DEC. 76
1050
3540
6320
2110
1010
3420
6630
2140
17980
1710
6490
[13490)
16330
1720
6620
[131701
70
3100
8830
2850
13620
2490
8480
N.A.
N.A.
39440
70
2960
8860
2790
13660
2420
8510
N.A.
N.A.
39270
T'KWYT(ZTPV 1971 TOTAL 1975 &RL
In addition to enrploynent data, gross sales data were obtained fran
the Texas Comptroller's Office of Public Accounts. Table 6 presents gross
sales data by industry. This infornation clearly demonstrates the dami-
nance of the trade sector in both the Brownsville and McAllen SMSAs. The
figures show the retail and wholesale sector claiming over 75 percent of
total gross sales in each county. 40 Table 7 provides further sales
breakdowns within the retail sector. These data show the general
merchandise division accounts for the largest amount of gross sales
in each county. Other divisions with high gross sales figures are
auto dealers and gas stations, and apparel and accessory divisions. 41
Other relevant findings come fram an earlier study of three
border towns (Juarez, Tiajuana, and Mexicali) condueted by the Bando
de Mexico, which reported the primary articles imported by Mexican
citizens. 'Ihese were food, drinks, clothing, shoes, furniture, and
household appliances. 4 2 With this informaticn, interviews conducted
by this author in late December attempted to construct the sequence
of events following the devaluation for retail merchants in those cate-
gories. TIhree variables controlled for were the size of the establishment,
its nerchandise selection, and the establishment' s location in the
city.
From talks with businessmen, it is evident that although the
peso's devaluation did not cae as a surprise, its timing did. As
early as January 1976, economic news reports had hinted at a pending
devaluation. 4 3
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'TABLE. 6
M6AILLEN-PHARR-EDINBURG SMSA
GROSS SALES BY INDUSTRY
(HIDALGO COUNTY)
(THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS)
% of TOTAL 1975 % OF TOTAL
AGRICULTURE,
FORESTRY &
FISHING ............ $ 8180
MINING ............ 1519
CONSTRUCTION ....... 14025
MANUFACTURING....... 65700
TRANSPORTATION...... 22545
COMMUNICATION
ELECTRIC & GAS...... 22545
WHOLESALE .......... 115548
RETAIL ............. 389875
FIN., INS.,&
REAL ESTATE......... 28
SERVICES ........... 20765
PUBLIC ADMINIS...... N.D.
1.3
.2
2.1
10.3
3.5
18.1
61.0
3.2
$ 30810
6109
22508
109938
14061
237113
623067
N.D.
37481
N.D.
2.9
.5
2.0
10.2
1.3
21.9
57.6
3.5
TOTAL .............. $638185 99.7 $1081096 99.9
BROWNSVILLE-SAN BENITO-HARLINGEN (CAMERON COUNTY)
GROSS SALES BY INDUSTRY (THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS)
INDUSTRY 1971 % OF TOTAL 1975- % QFsTOTAL
AGRICULTURE,
FORESTRY &
FISHING............$ 1736 .3 $ 877 .1
MINING .............. N.D. N.D. ----
CONSTRUCTION 10333 2.2 16232 1.8
MANUFACTURING 69202 14.9 152132 16.9
TRANSPORTATION 16725 3.6 12071 1.3
COMMUNICATION
ELECTRIC & GAS ....
WHOLESALE.......... 71992 15.5 187771 20.9
RETAIL .............. 279740 60.4 500488 55.9
FINANCE, INS.,
& REAL ESTATE...... 1003 .2 3717 .4
SERVICES........... 11934 2.6 21827 2.4
PUBLIC ADMINIS. N.D. N.D. ----
TOTAL ............. $ 462719 99.7 $ 895145 99.7
N.D.= Not Disclosed
Source: Sales Tax Analysis for Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas,
Texas Comptroller's Office of Public Accounts.
Austin, Texas. 1971-1975.
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TABLE 7
McALLEN-PHARR-EDINBURG SMSA (HIDALGO COUNTY)
GROSS SALES BY RETAIL DIVISION
(Thousands of dollars)
RETAIL DIVISION 1971 % Tota-l 1975 % Total
Building Materials $ 34,770
General Merchandise 50,846
Food Stores 128,912
Auto Dealers & Gas Stations 80,464
Apparel & Accessory 23,328
Furniture and Home Furnish. 11,749
Eating & Drinking Places 16,950
Drug Stores 10,186
Liquor.. Stores 1,512
Miscellaneous Retail 31,875
Total 389,875
9
13
33
21
6
3
4
3
.4
8
100.4
$46,960 8.2
99,318 16.5
158,066 26.2
129,848 21.5
36,975 6.1
24,481 4.0
34,107 5.7
14,863 2.7
3.058 .5
55,390 9.2
603,066 100.7
BROWNSVILLE-SAN BENITO-HARLINGEN (Cameron County)
GROSS SALES BY RETAIL DIVISION
(Thousands of dollars)
RETAIL DIVISION
Building Material
General Merchand'ise
Food Stores
Auto Dealers & Gas Stations
Apparel & Accessory
Furniture & Home Furnish.
Eating & Drinking Places
Drug Stores
Liquor. Stores
Miscellaneous Retail
Total
1971
28,347
57,966
53,960
58,944
21,672
9,713
15,655
5,846
1,952
25,685
279,740
% Total
10
21
19
21
8
3
6
2
1
9
100
1975 % Total
29,977
111,806
109,598
81,390
33,893
24,998
31,199
13,423
3,046
63,198
500,528
6
22
22
16
7
5
6
3
1
13
101
34
Source: Texas Comptrollers Office of Public accounts. Sales Tax
Analysis by Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area.
1971-1975. Austin, Texas.
Interviews revealed a particular reaction pattern among McAllen
retail merchants following the devaluatin. During the first week,
retailers cancelled all open orders and attempted to reduce inventories
through price markdowns. In many cases, sales remained in effect
throughout the Christmas shopping season.
Retail merchants next attempted to reduce operating expenses,
both personnel and non-personnel related. Employee cttbacks first
hit part-tine workers, while retailers scheduled full-time enplcyees
for less than the normal 40-hour week. Even the large national
franchises initiated substantial employee cutbacks.45
Although all retailers interviewed agreed sales dropped during
September, several contended that sales increased slightly following
the price markdowns. It is difficult, however, to collect data to
substantiate these claims.
Data currently available for a crude analysis are monthly
City Sales and Use Tax Allocataions, but such data are inadequate be-
cause the allocations are determined by the amount of taxable sales
reported by business. Business has the option of reporting either
nonthly or quarterly. So, one might expect those months ending the
quarter to display a higher sales tax allocatin figure than other
months, since more businessmen would then be reporting. This occurs,
unfortunately,however, the allocation figures demonstrate time
lags of two months. Thus, September sales figures are not reported
until November. For a more caprehensive analysis, it would be
necessary to examine the entire September to February tie period,
since the December and January period is regarded as a high sales
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season. It is important to know how the devaluation will affect this
traditionally high sales season since this knowledge could provide in-
sight into future Mexican consunption patterns.
With the October devaluation, the peso exchanged at a rate of
25 to one U.S. dollar. Ihus the Mexican government had effectively
doubled the cost of foreign goods in a period of less than two months.
Merchants saw the situation as hopeless.46 They reasoned that with
price markups of 35 to 100 percent, coupled with the 100 percent markup
by the devaluation, it seemed unlikely that 20 to 30 percent discounts
would attract Mexican custcmers. Further discounts, above these, would
nrean offering items at wholesale cost.
After a. short period of disagreement within nerchant associatimps,
mrost nerchants chose to accept the peso at the daily exchange rate,
apparently considering any purchase to be better than none. Sales continued,
in order to reduce inventories, as did employee layoffs and reduced
48
workweeks.
Following the second devaluation, many stores ran sales on
selected items, generally slow-moving merchandise not on reorder,
When sales slowdowns eventually became apparent, most retail merchants
attempted only to meet operating expenses until the peso stabilized.50
Merchants carrying nerchandise subject to seasonal demand
(clothing, electronics equipment, etc.) found themselves in a
different predicament. Their reaction suggested a store policy
of, liquidating those items at a Cost, prompted by the difficulty
of selling such items out of season or after they became obsolete.51
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In some cases, establishments unable to meet operating expenses accepted
pesos at higher than the official exchange rate; in effect offering
52greater discounts to buyers. Retail merchants generally agreed
that sales inproved as the Christmas holiday season approached. 5 3
Again, sales figures for the period are not available.
Factors Affecting the Devaluation's Impact on the Retail Sector
Logically, those businesses most heavily dependent on Mexican
customers suffered most, following the devaluation. In McAllen, the
downtown retail area and a recently opened shopping mall experienced
heavy sales losses. Their dependence on Mexican trade had been
spurred by the transit service fran Reynosaj. Tampaulipas to McAllen,
that primarily services the downtown area.
Retail markets located away from the McAllen downtown area
also experienced sales losses, but to a lesser degree. Their location
in a different market area coincided with their lesser dependence
on Mexican custoners. These retail merchants did attribute lost
sales to the devaluation, but for these establishments, reaction translated
into fewer part-time erployees rather than extensive cutbacks and
layoffs. 5 4
local stores of national chains (Penny's, Montgamery Wards,
Sears) experienced a smoother and less costly adjustment following
the devaluation. One manager of a national retail outlet revealed
the store's policy of selling irregular merchandise along the U.S.-
Mexican border. 5 5 These itens, purchased at special discounts,
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result in significant savings for the store over regular wholesale
costs, and at the same time the lower wholesale costs provide a
56
-competitive advantage over snialler retail stores. _ It was also
disclosed that the parent corpany cooperated in cancelling open
orders and offered concessions on selected sales items to their
chainstores on the border, follcwing the devaluation. 5 7 Another
interview with a national chainstore manager disclosed that the parent
campang was absorbing losses incurred by the conversion of pesos to
dollars. These losses particularly created problems for smaller
retail outlets, especially those cashing drafts written on Mexican
banks. Losses occurred when checks drawn on these banks took several
weeks to process, during which time the exchange rate was subject to
fluctuation. This, however, was a short-term problem.
At anytim, smaller retail merchants face operating disadvantages
not experienced by national retail outlets, because their purchasing
methods cannot match those of large chainstores in econamies of scale.
Ccnsequently, smaller retailers face a higher wholesale cost, which
translates into a higher cost per item. Large national retail outlets
cannot only match the prices of small retailers, but in scme cases,
offer selected items at cost in order to create custcmer traffic, a
practice the small retailer may not be able to afford.
Another difficulty, however, during this period for small
retailers was their limited merchandise selection. Downtown area
stores (specializing in clothing, electronic equipment, and household
appliances) faced stiff ccnpetition fram the large department and
general merchandise stores. 5 8 It seems reasonable to conclude that
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department stores, with their larger merchandise selectian, and lower
wholesale costs, held a distinct advantage during the adjustment period.
Employment Estimates in the Wholesale and Retail Sectors
Enployrrent in the retail sector has always been a significant
part of the U.S. border labor market. In recent years, the growth
in enployment opportunities in this sector has been tremendous, largely
because its popularity as a tourist area has increased and Mexican
shoppers have frequented the area in increasing numbrers. [See table
5 for employment data) Any discussion of the devaluation's impact
on retail enployment must include the number of workers affected.
Before describing the method of calculating the number, a discussion
of data problems is in order.
One difficulty with the data for this analysis is that the
employnent figures campiled by the Texas Employrent Caniission include
only those employees covered by the Unemployment Insurance Program:
therefore their numbers are not wholly representative of enployment
in the region. Another drawback of the data is caused by inaccuracies
in part-time =nd seasonal employment that results fran the anission
of workers not covered by unemployment campensation. Ihis is especially true
in agricultural industries and retail-wholesale firms. Since many
unenployed workers did not register at the local enployment ccanmission
officV, the unemploynent rate does not give a true indication of those
affected by the devaluation. In addition, figures are not collected in
a disaggregated form by industry, thus making analysis difficult.
For example, migrant farnworkers returning to their winter base in
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the area were not sep aated, by occupation, from other unemployed
groups in the statistics. The time frame of this study made it
difficult to separate their presence in the data fram those left
unemployed by the devaluation.
Weather also acted to distort employment data. Heavy rains
during November and December created slowdowns in agricultural operations.
The resulting layoffs are grouped, with devaluation slowdowns and
layoffs making accurate analysis difficult.
Because of the above prcblems encountered in data collection,
another method of estimation was utilized. In this process, percentage
breakdowns of employment by retail and wholesale divisions were cal-
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culated &sing survey data from March, 1973 Texas County Business Patterns.
The March, 1976 covered employment figures, reported by the Texas
Employment Cornission were distributed using the calculated percentages..
In the counties studied data collected by the two agencies only slight
percentage variations.
By distributing 1973 percentages to 1976 employment figures,
the analysis assunes a constant growth of each division in the retail-
wholesale sector over the 1973-1976 period. We know this not to be the
case since gross'-sales over the period show variatin throughout the
different retail divisions (if we allow gross sales to be a measure
of growth). Also, the figure underestimates seasonal employment since the nonth
we examine is March and not the holiday period of November to January.
Nonetheless, the estimate does give a "ballpark figure,"
In the McAllen-Pharr-Edinburg SMSA (1973), those retail divisions
reporting a high percentage of covered employment were: auto dealers and
4o
gas stations (28.4%), food stores (10.7%), eating and drinking places (10%),
and general merchandise (10%).
Most interesting is the general nerchandise division, which includes
department stores, variety stores, and miscellaneous general nerchandise
stores. The general merchandise division is isolated because, as pre-
viously mentioned, many of the items inported by Mexican consumers are
found in that division (household appliances, clothing, furniture, and
shoes). Table 8 presents these retail and wholesale labor force estimates
for the McAllen-Pharr-Edinburg SMSA and the Brownsville-Harlingen-San
Benito SMSA.
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TABLE 8
RETAIL AND WHOLESALE.LABOR FORCE ESTIMATES
McALLEN SMSA BROWNSVILLE SMSA
DIVISION % BREAKDOWN ESTIMATED % BREAKDOWN ESTIMATED
OF TOTAL MARCH, 1976 OF TOTAL MARCH, 1976
DIVISION (1973) LABOR FORCE DIVISION (1973) LABOR FORCE
WHOLESALE
Motor Vehicles &
Auto Equipment 2,3 418 .91 120
Groceries and
Related Products 28.4 5166 .10.09 1321
Farm Products &
Raw Materials .8 146 .47 62
Hardware, plumbing
Heating Equipment n.a. n.a. .89 118
Machinery, Equipment
Supplier 2.4 437 2.79 369
Miscellaneous 4.7 855 6.23 823
Subtotal 38.6 7440 21.38 2813
RETAIL
Building Materials 3.9 709 3.75 495
General Merchandise 10.0 1819 16.81 2221
Food Stores 10.7 1946 10.57 1396
Auto Dealers &
Service Stations 11.1 2019 11.38 1503
Apparel & Acessory 6.6 1200 8.30 1096
Furniture 3.2 582 3.17 419
Eating and Drinking 10.0 1819 15.29 2019
Miscellaneous 6.0 1091 6.79 893
Subtotal 61.5 11185 76.03 10042
Total 100.1 18625 97.41 12885
Sources: U.S. Economic Surveys Division[With
1973 Texas County Business Patterns
Assistance from Local Security
. Government Publications No.
Administration].
C-56.253-72-45
4:-
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SUMMARY
In past years, the retail sector has dominated the Valley's
economic activity. Employment gains occurred in the period from 1971-
196 and during that time food stamp participation dropped. The region
was profitable for retail firms and Mexican consumers constituted
a large percentage of their market.
However, with the devaluation, changes occurred. The timing of
the devaluation surprised many businessmen who attempted to minimize
their losses by cancelling orders, holding sales, and instituting
employee cutbacks. Those businesses most affected by the devaluation
were those located closest to the border, thereby mst dependent on the
business of Mexican shoppers; and those with a limited merchandise
selection. Iocal stores of chain outfits were also less affected by
the devaluation than the small independent retailer.
In any event, despite problems with data collection, it is obvious
the retail sector suffered revenue losses following the devaluation.
Problems in the data caused by reporting lags and imprecise recording
methods make it difficult to ascertain the devaluation's precise impact
on the retail sector. It is safe to say, however, that the low-skilled
employees found in the retail sector suffered from employee cutbacks
brought about by the devaluation. Furthermore, findings from the interviews
show that retail businesses will continue to minimize all costs, including
personnel, for an indefinite period. This suggests that any federal assist-
ance to retail businessmen will not bring back employment to the levels
prior to the devaluation.
This situation provokes serious questions about the area' s
future development especially since the retail sector comprises such
a large percentage of the area's total employment. Thus, the question
arises of the applicability of federal assistance to the area, and in
Chapter 6 the conflicting arguments behind the theories of federal
assistance to depressed areas is presented. Opponents to federal
assistance would argue that the retail sector's growth during the 1971-
1976 period was a normal market reaction resulting from Mexico's
currency policies. These policies created a competitive market
advantage over other retail locations and thus was taken advantage
of by private retail firms. Now that the devaluation has eliminated
this market advantage for the area, ccmnpetitive market forces
should be allowed to create a new equilbrium, disregarding enployment
losses, those opponents to federal aid would say.
As will be shown in Chapter 6, present development strategies
in the area have not involved the retail sector. Instead nost efforts
made by the Economic Development Administration have been directed at
investment in physical infrastructure and technical assistance to locating
businesses. Because little assistance is available to the retail sector,
this study begins to examine other strategies, that could be implemented
at this time. These strategies will be discussed in more detail in
Chapter 7.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE IMPACT ON BORDER FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
News accounts reported a substantial capital outflow from Mexico both
before and after the August 31 decision to devalue was announced. These ac-
counts provoked an examination of the amount and use of these funds. By using
demand and time deposit data, this analysis examines the rise in deposits in
ccmnercial banks following the devaluation. Interviews with comnercial bank
officials describe the investment created by these deposits,
In addition, savings and loan data fram the two cities document the
decrease in new loans following the devaluation, while interviews with these
banking officals provide speculation on the future lending policy of savings
and loans. The chapter concludes with an attenpt to understand, again through
interviews, how financial institutions perceive their role in the economic
development of the area. A more activist development role for these institu-
tions, and its resulting benefits for the area is then proposed.
COMMERCIAL BANKS
Runors of a possible devaluation provided an incentive for the
conversion of pesos to dollars before August 31, and many Mexican depositors
protected themselves against the possibility of financial loss by depositing
the converted pesos in American banks. Most of these deposits were re-
portedly placed in 90-day Certificates of deposit. Smaller banks located
in neighboring towns did not experience these flow of funds.60 Although
the available bank data suggest the devaluation did have an impact on deposits,
the information as presented here is not conclusive. For that to be
the case, data should have been presented from comparable
periods in time. Nonetheless, Table 9 presents time and demand
deposits data from federal member banks in McAllen and
Brownsville.
As the table shows, federal member banks in McAllen
reported an increase of approximately $10 million in time
deposits in October, moving from $129.6 million to $139.2
million. This represented a 7 percent increase over September,
and the largest percentage increase of the months examined.
October demand deposits decreased slightly from $86.3
million to $84.1 million.
In Brownsville, the pattern was the same. Time deposits
for September reported a drop of $695,000 but increased
dramatically in October by approximately $20.9 million,
an 8.7 percent gain over September's total deposits. November
netted an additional $14 million increase in time deposits.
Demand deposits in October decreased by $9 million, from
$157.2 million to $148.3 million.
Interviews with bank representatives made it clear that
the new deposits were not likely to produce long-term
bank investments because of uncertainty over the deposits'
duration. Two bank officials labeled them "hot funds" and
warned that committing the volatile deposits to long-term
investment could endanger the bank's reserve position if
the deposits were later withdrawn.(61)
Interviews suggested that much of Mexican capital is
TABLE 9
DEMAND AND TIME DEPOSITS FOR FEDERAL MEMBER BANKS, BROWNSVILLE, TEXAS
(Thousands of dollars)
DEMAND
DEPOS ITS
$145,627
148,886
140,989
149,228
140,217
156,309
157,215
148,317
152,556
152,151
PERCENT
CHANGE
2
-6
6
-6
11
1
-6
3
TIME
DEPOSITS
$216,898
227,867
228,704
229,021
233,154
237,964
237,237
259,091
273,123
285,030
DEMAND AND TIME DEPOSITS FOR FEDERAL MEMBER BANKS, McAllen, Texas
(Thousands of dollars)
PERIOD DEMAND PERCENT TIME PERCENT
ENDING DEPOSITS CHANGE DEPOSITS CHANGE
3/76 $85,997 $120,707
4/76 89,861 4 127,056 5
5/76 87,052 -3 128,825 1
6/76 86,850 - 129,723 1
7/76 85,693 -1 130,406 1
8/76 84,737 - 130,332 -
9/76 86,326 2 129,637 -l
10/76 84,145 -3 139,239 8
11/76 82,804 -2 139,136 -
12/76 90,339 9 143,950 3
Source: FEDERAL RESERVE
DEMAND AND TIME
January, 1977.
BANK, SAN ANTONIO BRANCH OFFICE.
DEPOSIT DATA. San Antonio, Texas.
4j 7
PERIOD
ENDING
3/76
4/76
5/76
6/76
7/76
8/76
9/76
10/76
11/76
12/76
PERCENT
CHANGE
12
2
9
5
4
DEPOSIT
invested in securities. The active securities trading market
makes it attractive to banks since it allows for adequate
liguidity. Bank officials also disclosed some banks'
policy of lending money from the new deposits to other banks
in order to maintain their reserve requirements. Forms
of bank investment probably varied considerably because
of the .tremendous amounts in new deposits. However, if
any investment pattern emerges, it is certainly characterized
by the word "short-term". (62)
Savings and Loans
The fourth quarter 1976 Savings and Loans figures
present a clearer indication of the devaluation's effects
on the banking industry. These effects are most pronounced on
the lending side. Table 10 presents data on the amount of
new savings, withdrawals, and new loans in the McAllen-Pharr-
Edinburg and Brownsville-San Benito-Harlingen SMSAs.
The figures show a sharp drop in all three categories.
In the McAllen-Pharr-Edinburg SMSA, new savings dropped
$5.6 million in the third quarter, 1976 figures, from $7.9
million to $2.3 million. Minus withdrawals, the quarter showed
a gain of $778,000, again down from $2.1 million in the previous
quarter. Of significance is the decrease in new loans. This
amount decreased by $4.2 million in third quarter figures,
moving from $5.6 million to $1.4 million.
For the Brownsville-Harlingen-San Benito SMSA, the
losses are more significant. New savings dropped $19.2
million from the previous quarter, from $29.7 million to
$10.5 million. Minus withdrawals, the gain for the quarter was
$2.3 million down from the third quarter figure of $8.4
million. Likewise, new loans also dropped off considerably,
falling from $15.8 million in the third quarter of 1976 to
$5.6 million in the fourth quarter, 1976; a loss of $10.2
million. (Percentages are found in Table 10)
Interviews with Savings and Loan officers in McAllen
disclosed particular policy changes in the savings and loans
industry, following the devaluation:
1. Loan paybacks accepted in U.S. dollars only.
2. Mexican depositors discouraged from trading with
savings and loans.
3. Closer examination of business operations before
making commercial property loans. (Property value (63)
no longer sole determinant for securing loan.)
According to the officers, the first policy change came
about as a result of the daily fluctuation in the peso's
exchange value for the dollar while the second policy change
was in response to the "softness" of the Mexican deposits.
Since savings and loans primarily provide home mortgage loans,
the risk of accepting large amounts of Mexican deposits placed
future pressure on their liquidity position. Moreover,
to accept deposits that were unsuitable even for short-term
transactions, i.e., consumer loans, would be costly in
terms of transacting and holding those funds. Finally, the
third policy change came in response to business slowdowns
TABLE !10
TOTAL
SAVINGS
BROWNSVILLE-HARLINGEN-SAN BENITO SMSA (CAMERON COUNTY)
SAVINGS AND LOAN DATA
(Thousands of dollars)
% NEW % WITH- % GAIN FOR % NEW %
CHANGE SAVINGS CHANGE DRAWALS CHANGE QUARTER CHANGE LOANS CHANGE
6/30/75 $166,122 $28,379 $19,225 $9,154 $11,774
9/30/75 173,495 4 25,959 -9 19,929 4 6.030 52 10,363 -14
12/31/75 179,928 4 26,783 3' 21,767 8 5,017 -20 11,675 11
3/31/76 193,448 7 34,241 22 22,400 3 11,040 120 13,360 13
6/30/76 200,677 4 30,259 -13 24,709 9 5,550 -99 16,825 21
9/30/76 211,525 5 29,736 -2 21,264 -16 8,472 66 15,860 -6
12/31/76 223,645 5 10r528 -182 8,250 -156 2,278 272 5,620 -182
MCALLEN-PHARR-EDINBURG SMSA (HIDALGO COUNTY)
SAVINGS AND LOAN DATA
(Thousands of dollars)
Quarter TOTAL % NEW % WITH- % GAIN FOR % NEW %
ENDING SAVINGS CHANGE SAVINGS CHANGE DRAWALS CHANGE QUARTER CHANGE LOANS CHANGE
$56,340
58,198
61,399
66,031
68,478
71,526
75, 915
3
5
7
4
4
6
$6,435
5,483
6,087
10,005
7,672
7,943
2(326
-17
10
39
-30
3
-?41
$4,196
4,272
3,625
6,177
6,203
5,792
1,~48
2
-18
69
7-
74
-274
$2,238
1,211
2,462
3,828
1,469
2,151
778
-85
49
55
-161
46
-176
$3,527
4,186
4,306
4,305
5,624
5,636
1,441
16
3
31
-291
SOURCE: TEXAS SAVINGS AND LOAN DEPARTMENT, SAVINGS AND LOAN DATA. AUSTIN, TEXAS. FEBRUARY, 1977.
QUARTER
ENDING
6/30/75
9/30/75
12/31/75
3/31/76
6/30/76
9/30/76
12/3]/76
and possible subsequent loan defaults by financially pressed
businessmen. (64)
THE ROLE OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
In the period following the devaluation when it is recog-
nized that there will be a decline in economic activity, it
is evident that the banking industry can play a role in
fostering economic development within the region because of
its financing capability. Financial institutions can play a
role in economic development. The extent of their participa-
tion in a region's development, however, is largely determined
by their interpretation of the institution's place in the
development process. Determining this perception was a key
objective during interviews with banking officials.
If financial institutions located in depressed areas,
such as South Texas, see their objectives and policies as
similar to those of financial institutions located elsewhere;
and that is to seek long-run profits by lending and investing
the funds at their disposal at as high a rate of return as
is consistent with an appropriate degree of principal, (65)
then it is very likely those funds will flow into areas paying
the highest for their use. However, since investment in a
depressed area does not provide the highest rates of return,
this means a further depletion of resources from a depressed
area can be expected in the long run. As Dominguez points out:
In societies in which there are extreme regional
differences .in industrial activity, there will be
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a general tendency for capital to migrate to richer
areas, thus causing a backward effect that would
tend to lessen investment to poorer regions of the
economy. There are certain side effects from these
capital shortages. If a community continues to
experience a capital bypass, the outcome will be a
further decrease in the level of economic activity
due to limited potential for technological
improvements. (66)
Aside from technological improvements, there are many
other costs to the region because of this "capital bypass".
Human resource investment and infrastructure investment are
limited as well as many other investment and multiplier effects.
Thus, much of this disinvestment is linked to the capital
shortage and the objectives of financial institutions.
The point that should be clear is that there are poten-
tially viable enterprises in depressed areas; but that these
enterprises are regarded as poor investments because internal
bank analyses do not accurately evaluate the long-term economic
benefits of such projects. Their main concern is the private
costs of lending those funds,and this .increases the importance of
examining a more appropriate future role for these institutions.
For a successful long-term development program to occur
w$:thin a depressed region, financial institutions must
acknowledge their role in that effort and then reflect that
acknowledgement in their lending practices, In practice, financial
institutions might begin by shifting small portions of their loan
portfolios into higher risk ventures, thus freeing some funds
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for projects that otherwise would not be funded. The
objective of such a move would be to allow innovative and
high-risk ventures to occur. However, if higher-risk is
related to a reduced capacity for repayment within certain
time periods, the financial institutions must be flexible in
arranging terms of repayment.
This policy change would serve three funcions: it
would transfer resources from traditional uses into innova-
tive, non-traditional ones; these marginal enterprises or
service delivery projects could promote and stimulate an
entrepreneurial response in those ventures funded. This
response alone might be an effective training mechanism
since a criticism of classroom vocational training has
usually been that the trainee learned his job on the
job.67 The success and/or creativeness of these enterprises
might attract attention and funds from other sources.
By activating small amounts of bank portfolios in certain
projects or enterprises, these results could be achieved.
Summary
To begin, this chapter's analysis examined the devalu-
ation's apparent impact of increasing bank deposits in
commercial banks. Although the bank data presented suggest
the devaluation did have such an impact on the commercial
banks, the information presented in this chapter is not
conclusive, Therefore, interviews with bank officials
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were utilized to augment the data. These interviews suggested
that inflowing Mexican capital was invested in securities
in order to allow for liquidity if the deposits were sud-
denly withdrawn.
Data from savings and loans however, presented firmer
evidence to show the devaluation's effects. The evidence
was most apparent in the fourth-quarter figures collected
by the Texas Savings and Loans Department and reported
both McAllen and Brownsville SMSAs with significant drops
in savings and new loans.
The banking industry has grown as a direct result of
the retail sector's growth during the early 1970s. It
has never acknowledged the possibility of its own role in
encouraging development. Rather, it has operated to maxi-
mize profits as would any private firm, Because the deval-
uation creates a depressing effect on the area's economy,
the role financial institutions could play in the area
becomes more important. Therefore, in the final section,
the analysis suggests new lending methods that could aid in
the border's development. In chapter 7, the potential
beneficiaries of these proposed changes in the lending pol-
icies of the financial institutions are examined, namely,
cooperatives and community development corporations, The
ability of these rural organizations to initiate enterprises
with the assistance of financial institutions will be
discussed,
CHAPTER FOUR
THE DEVALUATICOS IMPACT CN STATE-OPEPATED PFROGRAMS
Following the devaluation, there was much talk about the
increased government welfare cost attributed to the devaluation's
effects. In keeping with a significant theme of this analysis,
that is, reporting the effects of the devaluaticn, several state-
operated income-maintenance programs dre examined. Two programs .
in particular, the Unemployment Campensation Program operated by
the Texas Employment Crmissin and the Food Stamp Program maintained
by the Texas Department of Public Welfare, drew the nost attention.
These programs were primarily examined to estimate direct and
indirect employment cutbacks. In addition, the program data
illustrate the need for questioning the area's developnent, as
well as providing information on economic trends over the period of
1971 to 1976.
State Unemployment Comensation Program
It should be noted that not all employees are covered by
the Texas Unemployment Compensation Act of 1972. In the border
area this is especially significant, since agriculture workers
and dcmstic workers are excluded fro the Act. (68) Table 11
presents the number of workers covered by unenployment insurance
and the estimated enployed labor force. The figures demonstrate
that approximately 60 percent of total employment is covered under
the Act.
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TABLE 11
TOTAL EMPLOdYMEN AND COVERED EMPLOYMENT BY QUARTER
,MCALTEN-PHARR-EDINBURG SMSA
Quarter Total Emiployment Covered Employment Percent Covered
1st 62,617 40,151 64
2nd 60,950 40,035 65
3rd 60,440 40,019 66
4th 62,383 41,991 67
BROWNSVTTTE-HARLINGEN-SAN BENITO SMSA
Quarter Total Employment Covered Employment Percent Covered
1st - 68,843 41,383 60
2nd 67,670 41,517 61
3rd 63,133- 38,468 61
4th 68,690 43,220 63
Includes resident wage and salaried workers, self-employed, unpaid
family workers, and donestics in households, agricultural workers
and those involved in labor-management disputes.
SOURCE: TEXAS EMPLOYNT CMISSICN, "Covered Employment and Wages",
1975. Austin, Texas.
The responsibility for making payments in the Unemployment
I A
Compensation program is shared by the state and federal government.
The four categories under which payments are made are: the State,
Ex-servicen-en, Federal Employees, and Intrastate. The last category
refers to a joint respansibility between the state and the federal
government.
In examining the total amount of unemployment campensation
payn-ents made in the months following the devaluation, the analysis
uncovers same unusual changes. Both the Brownsville SMSA and the
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McAllen SMSA displayed the same pattern. In September, the month
following the devaluation, little change in the amounts resulted.
The following month, however, both SMSAs reported a drop in total
payments, giving the impression of an improving situation.
In absolute dollar terms, the McbAlen SMSA showed a drop
of $58,308,15 percent less than Septenber's total of $ 388,000.
In the Brownsville SMSA, the absolute drop in payments was $13,798,
a 4 percent decrease from $331,000. The next month, Novenber,
showed a significant increase in both counties, a 19 percent gain
over Septembez:'s total figure in the Brownsville SMSA. And although
the McAllen SMSA displayed an increase over October's payments,
it still was approximately $20,000 below Septenber's figure.
These figures seem to suggest that initially, employnent
cutbacks hit those employees not covered by unemployment ccapen-
sation. However, as the economic situation worsened, new
employmrent cutbacks hit the full-time enployees who qualified
for the program. Other program data provided on initial claimants
reinforces this hypothesis. Table 12 presents these data.
An examination of the information on initial claimants
shows a similar trend to that displayed by the aggregate unemployment
payments. Examining the data for the Brownsville SMSA, it can be
seen that initial claims increased significantly during the mronths
following the devaluation, although total claimants dropped
the month preceding the devaluation. The number of initial claimants
for the McAllen SMSA depicted the same drop in claims preceding the
month of the devaluation, and then a sharp rise in both initial and
57
TABLE 12
MALEN-PHARR-EDINBUIRG SMSA (HIDALGO COUNT Y)
INDIVIDUALS ON UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION
Month1 U.I. Weeks Claimed % Change INITIAL CLAIMS % Change
9/75 1749 231
10/75 1597 -9 146 -37
11/75 1845 13 220 34
12/75 1971 6 203 -8
9/76 1660 230
10/76 1606 3 283 19
11/76 1809 11 303 7
12/76 2195 18 265 -13
BROWNSVILLE-HARLINGEN-SAN BENITO (CAMEION COUNTY)
INDIVIDUALS ON UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION
Month' U.I. Weeks Claimed % Change Initial Claims % Change
9/75
10/75
11/75
12/75
9/76
10/76
11/76
12/76
'Survey
2350
1804
1887
2425
2454
2366
2381
2737
-30
4
23
-4
1
15
239
245
295
315
234
245
324
2
17
-13
-26
4
26
taken the week of the 12th.
Source: Texas Employment Comission, Unemployment Compensation Data. Austin,
Texas. January 1977. Unpublished material.
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total claims, especially in December, 1976.
State Food Stamp Program
The Texas State Department of Public Welfare's Food stamp
program was examined in assessing the devaluation's impact for several
reasons. For one, the agency's data were available for camparable
periods over several years, allowing the consideration of time trends.
In addition, program data were detailed so that precise program
costs could be figured.
Interviews with local food stamp directors revealed that the
program had been affected by the devaluation. At the McAllen program
office, it was pointed out that applications increased from 333 in July
to 451 in September and 386 in October. (69) The figures for this
office alone were substantially higher than those figures on initial
claimants.
Another measure of increased activity mentioned during interviews
was "lead-time". Lead-time refers to the period of time taken by the local
office to process an application from the initial request for application
to the interview with individual caseworkers. As a result of the
increased number of applicants following the devaluation, lead-time
increased from the previous average of a one-to-two day period, to a
four-to-seven day process. (7 In addition, a large number of requests
were made by participants for price reductions on the food stamp
allotment. A particular example cited was of a caseworker who processed
the cases of eight individuals who had received cutbacks in working
hours and three individuals who had lost their jobs during September alone.
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This caseload was said to be fairly camnon during the months after the
devaluation. 71)
Table 13 below, provides data on the number of program participants,
cash value of the food stamps issued, and cash received fram participants.
The program data were available fram both the Brownsville and McAllen
SMSAs.
Although interviews with local directors attributed increased
program costs to job cutbacks made necessary by the devaluation, such
attribution is difficult to substantiate with the program data presented.
TYh!e figures instead show the number of participants in the program
following the devaluation was lower than camparable periods earlier in
the program. This drop in participation over the years 1971-1976 was a
direct result of employment growth in the area. In other words, the
1971-1976 period of growth with its increasing employment opportunities
caused participation in the program to drop. If data are examined in particular
periods from 1974-1976, it can be denonstrated that program participation
has been declining over several years. Hence, at this time, it is difficult
to attribute program participation increases to the devaluation because of
the lower participation figures in prior years.
Another drawback with the data is that the figures reflect the
presence of an incaming migrant population. As mentioned. earlier, many
migrant farmworkers use Hidalgo and Cameron counties as a winter base
primarily because of the area's varied agricultural employment opportunities.
Heavy participation by this group during the winter months pushes the food
stamp program participation figures up rapidly. For example, in December.r
1974, cambined figures for the Brownsville and McAllen SMSAs show an
increase of 18,723 participants over the period of September to December.
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TABLE 4
MCALLEN-PHARR-EDINBURI (Hidalgo County)
FOOD STAMP PROGRAM
NUMBER OF
PERSONS
PERCENT
CHANGE
TOTAL VALUE OF
STAMPS ISSUED
PERCENT
CHANGE
CASH RECEIVED
Sept.
Oct.
Nov.
Dec.
Sept.
Oct.
Nov.
Dec.
1974
1974
1974
1974
1975
1975
1975
1975
Sept. 1976
Oct. 1976
41,776
44,817
45,767
46,158
37,945
40,986
40,509
41,382
34,174
35,679
7
2
1
7
-1
2
4
1,398,166
1,501,424
1, 529,588
1,531,693
1,344,938
1,438,357
1,420,501
1,456,125
1,252,786
1,300,117
BRNSVILLE-HARLINGEN-SAN BENI'IO SMSA (CAMERON COUNTY)
FOOD STAMP PROGPAM
NUMBER OF PERCENT TOTAL VALUE OF PERCENT CASH RECEIVED PERCENT
MONTH PERSONS CHANGE STAMPS ISSUED CHANGE CHANGE
Sept. 1974 61,427 2,027,277 626,181
Oct. 1974 68,819 11 2,351,819 14 687,414 9
Nov. 1974 76,263 10 2,561,891 8 745,358 8
Dec. 1974 75,767 -1 2,537,777 1 768,043 3
Sept. 1975 59,687 2,136,811 636,539
Oct. 1975 66,337 10 2,343,556 9 713,933 11
Nov. 1975 66,938 1 2,348,684 - 732,980 3
Dec. 1975 68,287 2 2,407,958 2 773,820 5
Sept. 1976 52,986 1,957,573 584,995
Oct. 1976 57,387 8 2,102,996 7 616.117 5
PERCENT
CHANGE
7
2
6
-1
-2
4
459,818
478,744
452,644
491,579
436,568
466,097
467,390
485,915
404,808
408,187
4
-6
8
6
4
1
SOURCE: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE, AUSTIN,TEXAS. ]DECEMBER 1977
This represented an 18.1 percent increase over the 1974 Septerber total
of 103,203. In 1975 over the same monthly period, the absolute number of
participants grew by 12,037, a 12 percent increase over September's total
of 97,032. Thus, the program data demonstrate a declining figure over
camparable periods in time.
SUMMARY
This chapter has examined the changes following the devaluation in
program participation and expenditures of two state-operated welfare pro-
grams: the Unemployment Compensation Program and the Food Stamp Program.
The findings of these program analyses are as follows:
1. Employees covered by unemployment insurance were not
immediately affected by the devaluation.
2. It was not until two months following the devaluation
that the Unemployment Insurance Program registered a
major increase in participation.
3. Food stamp participation had been declining steadily
over the years prior to the devaluation~.
4. Although food stamp officials disclosed increased
activity following the devaluation, seperating the
effects of incoming migrants and devaluation victims
proved difficult.
In addition, this chapter has presented data documenting the
number of participants in incame-maintenance programs. The magnitude
of this participation leads to a questioning of development strategies
that would provide alternatives to these incame-maintenance. Chapter
7 of this study, concludes with a discussion of Community Developnent
Corporations and Cooperatives, two alternative developnent proposals that
offer training, and educational benefits, rather than taking a passive
incame-maintenance role.
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PART TWO
OVERALL REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT ISSUES FOR THE LOWER RIO GRANDE VALLEY
As stated in the introduction, this section will examine
how the devaluation's impact on the region's retail sector, its
financial institutions, and two state-operated income main-
tenance programs serve to pinpoint the area's critical
need for new development strategies. We begin by examining the
area's post-devaluation development strategies, U.S. immigra-
tion policy along the border, and illegal immigration from
Mexico; the three major issues certain to be affected by the
devaluation. Development theories, both explaining and challen-
ging the rationale behind federal assistance to the area are
next explored, while chapter 7 is devoted to a short discussion
of possible alternative strategies in the area,
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE MAJOR ISSUES RAISED BY THE DEVALUATION
The devaluation raised significant issues for different
areas of the United States; not only border states and com-
munities, but for urban areas of the interior United States
as well. These issues as they concern the South Texas bor-
der region are post-devaluation development policies, U.S.
immigration policy as it concerns the commuter, and illegal
immigration from Mexico.
To begin, the analysis focuses on why the region has
developed in the way it has; specifically the area's disad-
vantages for locating firms, such as transportation costs
and the low-skilled labor supply. Second, the development is
discussed in light of Mexico's economic policies during the
1971-1976 growth period and the subsequent devaluation. A
discussion of past development proposals completes the
framework for understanding the area's development his-
tory. The next step of this analysis is a brief exami-
nation of the present development strategies implemented by
the Economic Development Administration (EDA) and varous other
funding agencies, The emphasis and priorities of EDA's de-
velopment strategies are then mentioned,
The second major issue brought to policymakers' atten-
tion by the devaluation is that of the commuter. The
devaluation's effects in Mexico provide additional pressure
for increasing numbers of Mexican workers to commute into the
U.S. border labor market. The study first explains the com-
muter's legal status, then follows with a discussion of
past and proposed policy responses to the problems created by
the commuter.
The chapter concludes with the third major issue raised
by the devaluation: the two types of migrants, the target and
professional, and explains why the devaluation's impact is
likely to increase illegal immigration by target migrants.
Data on the number of apprehended aliens will be provided
to document the presence of illegal migrants in border
areas, followed by speculation of future migration proba-
bilities. Also, the analysis outlines both past and proposed
policy responses to the problems caused by the illegal
alien and alternatives to these policies proposed by the
U.S. Congress, the agriculture industry, Chicano groups, and
the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). Criticism
of proposed policies concerning aliens concludes the chapter.
The Development Issue
The lower Rio Grande Valley has always been a depressed
region of the country. Private firms have been reluctant
to locate in the region for a number of reasons:
a low-skilled poorly educated labor force, the
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region's distance from major market areas, and its water shortage being
only a few. In the late 1960's and early 1970's, the area experienced a
period of rapid growth. This growth was fueled by the Mexican Border Indus-
trial Program of which Brownsville was a maj-tr location for U.S. firms
participating , and the rapid cost-of-living increase in Mexico.( 72)
During this period, as Mexican consumer prices increased rapidly relative
to U.S. consumer prices, Mexican consumers were attracted to U.S. border
retail markets. [From 1972. to October, 1976; the month following
the devaluation, the Mexican consumer price index increased by over 100
percent, while real income increased by only 50 percent during this period)
This rise in real income coincided with increasing Mexican demand for
foreign-made (priamrily U.S.) consumer goods. Creating some of this
increased demand were the tremendous population growth in Mexican border
towns, an increasing urban population, and the growth of the Border Industrial
Program.
This large Mexican consumer market sparked a tremendous growth in the
retail-wholesale and service sectors of the area. [An increase of over
10,000 jobs in these sectors during the 1971-1975 period in the McAllen
SMSA] re rapid growth also contributed to the decreasing pressure for out-
ward migration by the population, especially farnmorkers. It is the quick
reversal of these trends brought on by the devaluation that raise the
following policy concerns:
1. Will the economic consequences of the devaluation create
increased pressure for Mexican migration into U.S. border labor
markets, thus stimulating increased job ccnpetition and outmigration
by U.S. border residents? In order to answer, policy makers must
know the preferred destinations of incoming migrants, the occu-
pations and industries likely to be affected, and an idea of the
migration's magnitude.
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2. Since rapid development took place largely because of an
overvalued peso, what will happen to development now that
the market advantage has disappeared.
These questions require prcupt action for several reasons. To a ll o w
the region to become depressed from lack of investment creates pressure
for outmigration by the labor force. ' However, in this situation, because of
the past growth in the region, the labor force should have undergone some
training and work experience. It is possible that this upgrading is
substantial enough to attract other labor-intensive industries or the
establishment of new enterprises through local and federal government
contracts.
Secondly, the border should be viewed as a strategic area within
the context of achieving broader policy cojectives, such as full erployment.
Investing in the development of the border regions slows rural population
migration into larger urban areas, and could also reduce Mexican migration
into urban areas because of the increased job opportunities within the'
proximity of Mexico. Certain future policy proposals for area development
must consider these possibilities, and chapter 7 of this paper will discuss
alternative strategies. The present policy responses to these questions- are
discussed here, following an examination of past proposals for the area's
development.
Past Development Proposals for the Area
In 1970, Hansen argued that development 'in South Texas was not feasible. 74)
He claimed the South Texas region could not generate enough economic growth
to significantly inpact wages and enployment for the- Mexican-Americans
residing there. Additionally he states the area's reroteness from major
markets precluded any attractive incentives for private firms to locate
there. Instead, Hansen theorized that human resource developnent could
provide one solution to South Texas economic problems. He states that
providing human resource opportunities (vocational-technical training) to
Mexican-Americans would at least give them the option to migrate to
other areas with more employment possibilities. Although Hansen considered
immigration from Mexico to be detrimental to the economic welfare of the
border resident, he proposed no action on this matter.
Four years later, Vernon Briggs examined the South Texas border
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situation. Although Briggs did not direct his analysis at the developrent
potential of South Texas, he clearly stated that development must occur
in Mexico' s northern states before the economic welfare of the border resident
would improve. Briggs claimed that inmigration and border policies
are important features in explaining the depressed nature of the region.
Moreover, he added, it is these policies that defeat the purpose of renedial
education, migrant assistance, public service enployment, and economic
development programs. ( 76) Finally, Briggs stated that if these programs
are in the interest of good foreign relations with Mexico (as stated by some) , (
then monetary assistance should be substituted to enable Mexico to develop
its northern economy. ( 78)
Both proposals deserve comment. Hansen's examination of South
Texas as a potential growth center, makes some questionable assump-
tions that the area lacks profit potential for locating firms. How-
ever, this omits many local enterprises that could operate profitably
on a smaller scale by reducing transportion costs, which he considers
the area's greatest disadvantage. Additionally, Hansen suggests
providing training and educational programs to create migration
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opportunities. Hansen neither examines the costs of migration, nor
the language, race, and cultural barriers that Chicanos would face.
Briggs stated the commuter problem clearly, but ignores how
financial assistance would aid development and decrease migration.
He implies the problem is the lack of capital to finance develop-
ment, but does not explain the structural obstacles inherent in
the region.
Present Development Strategies
At present, federal and state development efforts are coordinaited
by the Lower Rio Grande Valley Development Council. This council was
organized, staffed, and put into operation in accordance with Econcmic
Develcpnent Adinistration (EDA) guidelines. The creation of the Council
follcwed the enactment of the Public Works and Economic Develqment Act
of 1965. The purpose of this legislation was to assist econcmically
depressed areas of the United States to develop and implement public works
projects that would create new opportunities for long-term employment and
econamic growth.
In the past, the Council',s primary emrphasis has consisted of non-
human resource develcpment projects; e.g,, cpen-space planning, land-use
planning, water and sewer planning, and water pollution control
planning.
The Council's development priorities are influenced both by EDA's
guidelines and its growth center strategy. By definition, a grcwth center
is a complex consisting of one or more communities or places, which taken
together provide, or are likely to provide, a range of cultural, social,
employment, trade, and service functions for itself, and its associated
rural hinterland. (79) The rationale behind such a strategy is that the
growth of this development is then expected to carry over into the
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redevelopment areas within the district.
Despite the area's designation as a growth center, no federal
funds are targeted for projects. Instead, funding for individual
development projects are processed through regular EIA eligibility
requirements. Similarly, the South Texas Greater Cultural Basin
Commission, a state approach to econcinic planning and delivery of
government services, has never received funds fran the State legislature
to iaplement any special programs. Instead, the Canmission's
recrmendations are in direct competition for state funds with
other area commissions around the state. These rival ccnrissions
usually represent more populated and, politically speaking, more
powerful regions of the state.
Most funds for development projects cae frcm federal sources,
namely, the Department of Agriculture, Ccrmerce, and Labor. These
are briefly described below.
The Department of Cammerce includes the Eccncnic Development
Administraticn. As stated earlier, EDA provides funds to eligible
organizations in depressed regions of the country. The agency
provides grants and loans for the construction of public works,
direct business loans, and technical assistance loans for business,
industrial and natural resource projects. (8 ) A more comprehensive
examination of EDA' s approach to rural development is included in
Chapter $ix-
The Department of Agriculture does not maintain many programs
that affect rural econcaic developtent. Two programs that do offer
aid to rural comunities, however, are the Financial Assistance to
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Small Towns and Rural Groups and the Fanrer' s Hame Administration
(81 )
Rural Renewal Loans. The former offers loans to non-profit
groups, cooperatives, and small towns (population under 5000) for
municipal improvements. The latter program provides loans and
loan insurance in rural areas (similar to the Federal Housing
Administration) (82)
The Department of Labor provides services in rural areas
that are beneficial to meeting the objectives of rural development.
For exanple, the Camprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA)
provides funds for training and supportive services to the unemployed.
of special importance to rural areas is Title VI of CETA. This
title focuses attention on public service slots in ccmmnity-based
projects. The imrportance of this legislation is discussed in
Chapter Seven under the heading of public employment programs.
To sunmarize briefly, this section has discussed the problem
of economic develcpment along the South Texas border. It has examined
the area's rapid growth during the late 1960's and early 1970's and
the reasons for it. Thus, concern arises over the effects devalua-
tion will have on employment, migration and business, etc. Past
proposals are examined and their limitations stated. Present
development programs practiced by the Department of Agriculture,
Comerce, and Labor are described. Criticisms of these programs
are presented in later chapters.
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The Commuter Issue
The major employment threat to the local U.S. border labor
force is not the illegal alien; rather, it is the commuter.
As explained earlier, a commuter is a legal visitor permitted a
maximum stay of 72 hours in the United states, within a 25-
mile radius of the border. However, since the crossing permit
cards bear no date indicating when the bearer crossed the border,
there is really no way to enforce the law or to determine how
long a commuter is actually in the country.
The commuter system rests on administrative interpreta-
tion tather than statute. This resulted from a Board of Immi-
gration Appeals decision in 1959 stating the situation was
predicated upon good international relations between the
United States and Mexico. Consequently, the U.S. worker who
competes with Mexican commuters pays a substantial part of what
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the Secretary of State considers foreign aid.
The status of the commuter raises the particular concern
of increased migration into border labor markets. Although a
violation of the law, this practice has been well documented
in Ericson's' and North's studies. In addition, commuters
find it easier to migrate into the interior of the United
States as a commuter rather than as illegal aliens because they
are not questioned by the U.S. border patrol.
During November, 1976 to January,1977, figures on the
number of crossing commuters were unavailable. This drawback
made it difficult to identify the number and occupations of
workers affected by the devaluation. The lack of data was especially
7/2
important since many retail nerchants interviewed identified the
severest employment cuts coming at retail establishments enploying
high numbers of conuters. 84) Furthermore, with unemployment estimated
at 40 percent of the labor force in Reynosa, (the twin city of McAllen),
it becomes a serious issue to examine.
Policy Responses to the Comuter Issue
Imigration policy as it regards the Mexican ccmnuter has
always generated discussion. Opponents to border-crossing passes
have always cited the prcblems produced by the "carnuter"; e.g.,
increased job ccupetitio for low-skilled employment, a depressing
effect on wages, and the disrupting effect on union activities.
Proposals to curtail this inmigration have ranged fram termination
of the program to taxing employers for hiring, cmouters. (85) Other
suggestions have included a ccmuter ticket to be purchased by cormuters
crossing the bo&der for employment in the United States, and strong
local programs encouraging employers to give hiring preference to U.S.
residents. ( 86)
Considering the labor force in Mexican border towns, any
cutback in the ccmuter program must contend with the possibility
of illegal immigration by those same workers. To strictly enforce
any employment sanctions against conmuters would be extremely
difficult for fear of violating the suspected worker's civil
rights. The local Texas Employment Cornission office itself,
fears this type of legal action brought against them. When asked
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whether they requested proof of citizenship or residency for job
placement services, ZEC officials replied no. ( 87) Even when a work
history shows an individual as never having worked in the United
States, the Texas Employment Commission still does not refuse place-
ment services. (88)
A major problem of presenting any counter proposal to the
present commuter status is the limited understanding of the
problem's magnitude along the border. The last study completed
(89)
was in 1970 by North. Without relevant information on the
occupation and number of jobs ccmmuters are employed in and their
yearly work patterns, it becames unrealistic 'to direct. policy
action. At this time, such information is not even available,
although it could be easily collected by the Inmigration and-
Naturalization Service. Moreover, given this information, the
labor certification process beccmes much more effective. For then,
decisions are based to some degree on information on labor demands
in the area, and the occupational information on the connuter.
The Issue of. Illegal Migration
The problem of illegal aliens in the United States has
existed for many years, yet no one knows the actual number of illegal
aliens who cross annually into this country. The numbers available
fram the Irmigration and Naturalization Service on illegal aliens
only account for those apprehended. Overall, the number of apprehended
illegal aliens has been growing at a tremendous rate since the
termination of the Mexican labor Program (Bracero Program) in 1964.
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Along the border, the problem of the illegal alien has
been less pronounced. This has probably resulted fran the area's
scarce employment opportunities, the fear of detection by the Border
Patrol, the region's lower wage scales, and the growth of large
Spanish-speaking populations in major metropolitan cities. However,
this is not to say that illegal aliens are not found in significant
numbers along the border. In 1975, the number of apprehended aliens
in the McAllen sector totaled 32,028. Iost of those apprehended were
Mexican males. Of this number, 8773 were employed at the tine they
were apprehended. The large percentage of those employed were found
in agricultural activities and at wage levels of below $2.50 per
hour. ( 5) Table 14 depicts this information (on the next page
Migration Probabilities
Given the long history of Mexican migration into the United
States, Mexico's population projected to increase by 12 million
in six years, the characteristics of a young and growing labor
force, and the existing wage differentials for unskilled labor; it
seems unlikely illegal migration into the United States fran Mexico
will diminish. ( 9 6 )
Recent and relevant research on Mexican migration into the
(97)United States provides some interesting new findings for discussion.
In his study, Cornelius makes a distinction between two types of
migrants, the 'target migrant and the "professional" migrant. (98)
The target migrant relocates because of severe econamic necessity
precipated by drought, premature frost, or same other temporary
condition which severely reduces family incame. ( 99) His migration
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TABLE 14
EMPLOYMENT OF APPREHENDED ILLEGAL ALIENS BY
INDUSTRY AND WAGE LEVEL (MCALLEN SECTOR)l
$4.50-$6.49 $2.50-$4.49
HEAVY
INDUSTRY
LIGHT
INDUSTRY
AGRICULTURE
CONSTRUCTION
SERVICE
TOTAL
lIncludes the counties of Starr,
Brooks, and Jim Wells.
Cameron, Hidalgo, Willacy, Kleberg,
2
Represents 27% of the total apprehended, 32,028.
Source: Immigration and Naturalization Service, McAllen Office.
Deportable Aliens Located by Border Patrol, Reporting
Office McAllen Sector Consolidated, Fiscal Year 1975,
McAllen, Texas.
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$6.50 $2.50 Total
0
2
1
5
323
15
5
0
2
4611
42
22
14
14
103
947
6881
134
646
860425
1006
6909
149
663
287713.
is of a short-term nature. The professional' migrant, however, views
migration as a feature of his family life, a way of making 
a living. (10(
Although Cornelius' research does not include numbers for each
group, the majority of the professional migrants he interviewed had
obtained legal entry papers. Because present statistics on apprehended
illegal aliens identify the problem as being illegal migration, this
suggests that target migrants outnumber professional migrants. It
also implies that if the devaluaticn increases migration it will be
the target migrants who are affected. Cornelius makes
clear that most migration (fram those ccmmniities studied to the United
States), is temporary. The average stay is six to eight months, with
most migrants leaving Mexico in March and returning in early December.
Cornelius also suggests tLat migrants appear to have preferred
destinations. Poor migrants, without immtigration papers, prefer jobs
located in small towns or rural areas, because of the lower costs-of-
living there. (10 Agricultural workers find California rore
desirable than Texas because of its higher wages. (103 If this
hypothesis is true, it suggests a high degree of information about
the States reaches Mexican ccmnunities, and illegal entrants are more
"knowledgeable" than most writers jive credit.
Pblicy Pespcnses to the Illegal Immtigration Issue
Any solution to the problem of illegal irmmigration must
begin with revisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952.
This Act made the imrportatio and harboring of illegal aliens a
felony. However, in bowing to special agricultural interests from
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Texas, the Act also contains a section that came to be knwn as the
"Texas proviso". This section states that employment and related
services provided by enplcryers, i.e., transportation, housing,
medical aid, etc., does not canstitute an illegal act of harboring
an illegal alien; in effect, negating the intent of the Act.
As the nunber of apprehended aliens has grown since the
terminaticn of the Bracero program in 1964, the issue of illegal mi-
gration has received increasing attention. In 1972, a subcarmittee
of the Comrittee on the Judiciary of the U.S. House of Representatives
held extensive public hearings on this subject. That year, a bill
that proposed fines and jail terms for employers knowingly hiring
illegal aliens was passed by the House, but not by the Senate. (104
In 1973, House Bill 982, another bill concerning the illegal
alien was introduced to the House. This legislation proposed the
following three-step procedure in dealing with the employer:
1. For a first violation, the U. S. attorney general is
directed to serve a citation on the employer, stating
that a violation has occurred, and that the enployer has
a period of time to clear the matter.
2. If said enployer camits a subsequent violation within
two years after receiving a citation, the Attorney General
is directed to impose a fine of not more than $500 for
each alien located on the premises;
3. Following the imposition of a fine, an employer who conmits
an additional violation will be subject to a fine of
$1000 and a one-year imprisonment for each alien.
Again this bill was passed in the House, but not acted upon
in the Senate.
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Senators with strong agricultural interests in their homestates
have worked hard to defeat passage of the bill. Most notable among
them has been Senator J. Eastland frcm Mississippi who submitted
a bill on the subject calling for mild fines for employers but no
threat of imprisonment.
Other bills aimed at the illegal inmigration issue have
not been as stringent on enployers as House Bill 982 proposed.
Alternative prcposals have suggested work identification cards for
workers making possible use of the Social Security Administration (SSA);
the objective being that while applying for Social Security cards,
applicants could be easily identified. This amendment would grant
the SSA the authority to require social security applicants to
furnish evidence of their citizenship, alien status, and true identity.
An unusual coalition between Chicano groups and the agriculture
industry has arisen to fight the passage of these proposals. Chicano
groups have stated their reservation to these proposals; their primary
concern involving the possibility for emplcyers to use the legislation
as a cover for discrimatory hiring practices.
The agriculture industry has argued that without illegal
aliens, some agricultural activities cannot be completed. Industry
officials claim that in .this case the illegal alien displaces no
one, but. rather plays an important productive role.
Proponents for strong illegal alien legislation contend
that the majority of illegal aliens are not found in agriculture,
7.9
but scattered through a diverse mixture of job occupations. They
claim, in fact, that illegal aliens take jobs at lower wages
displacing many U.S. workers; perhaps not in agriculture, but in
the construction, service, and heavy industries. Thus, they say
that to make attempts at achieving full employment goals without
attempting to solve the problem of the illegal alien is unrealistic.
Another proposal for dealing with the illegal alien has
been suggested by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS).
INS contends that by substantially increasing its operating
budget, illegal inmigration could be reduced. Increased employment
and detainment facilities for the illegal entrant would make it
more difficult for the illegal entrant to cross the border. At
present funding levels, the INS claims this cannot be done.
An additional alternative for dealing with the illegal alien
is provided by the Hall Bill, presently pending in the Texas State
legislature. The Hall Bill places tighter controls on farm labor
contractors, rather than on employers of illegal aliens. Farm labor
contractors act as the negotiators in recruiting farm labor crews for
agricultural growers. Although these contractors are required
to be licensed by the Texas Bureau of Labor and Standards, many are
not. It is suspected that these ccntractors recruit a large number
of illegal aliens for agricultural work. 005) The Hall Bill authorizes
the Texas Bureau of Labor and Standards to inpose penalties on
unlicensed labor contractors of up to $1000 per worker. Supporters'
of the legislation feel that by cracking down on farm labor contractors
the illegal alien problem will diminish. ?06
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CRITICISMS OF POLICY RESPONSES '1O THE PROBLEM OF THE IET GAL ALIEN
A major criticism of present approaches to the illegal alien
prcblem concerns policymakers' definition of the problem. All pro-
posals considered here implicitly assume that the illegal alien
problem can be settled within the United States. Hence, their
proposals suggest actions limited to within the United States.
At this time, policy makers have not proposed direct technical
or financial aid to Mexico as a means of solving the problem of the
illegal alien within the United States. Instead, policymakers
direct legislation at the employers of illegal aliens hoping that
in the short-term, the legal sanctions will reduce demand for
illegal alien labor, and in the long-run, bring about attitudinal
changes of Mexican migrants by increasing the difficulty of firding
employment.
There will be difficulties in enforcing any legislation that
attempts to deal with the alien problem. For one, the employers
of illegal aliens may be sole proprietors, partnerships, or corpor-
ations. The difficulty of prosecuting corporate bodies limits the
effectiveness of the legislation, especially since the fear of
imprisonment is negated.
In addition, the legislation does increase the possibility of
discrimatory hiring practices. Although proponents argue that work
identification cards would eliminate such actions, this does not
prevent individual employers fram denying employment to Spanish-
speaking Americans under the cover of protecting themselves from
legal actions.
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Summary
In this chapter, three issues raised by the devaluation's
impact are examined: post-devaluation development policies,
U.S. immigration policy as it concerns the commuter, and
illegal immigration into the United States from Mexico,
The analysis briefly reviews the area's economic
history and recent rapid growth, as explained in chapter
two, and examines how the quick reversal of these growth
trends caused by the devaluation may depress the region's
economic development. This section on the development issue
included a short examination of past development proposals
for the area and strategies 'presently employed by EDA and
other federal agencies.
The chapter next examined the concern raised by the
devaluation about increased numbers of commuters entering
U.S. border labor markets. Along the border, commuters pre-
sent more problems to the resident labor force because of
their legal status. It was found that data on commuters
were not sufficient to make policy suggestions, although
border authorities (INS) could collect the information
quite easily. This information would make the labor cer-
tification process, the process by which legal aliens are
admitted, more effective.
Finally, this chapter examines the issue of illegal
migration, a probability increased by the devaluation,
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For that reason, several studies dealing with the subject
were reviewed. In his writings, Cornelius suggests that
those most affected by the devaluation will be target migrants,
individuals who would not necessarily migrate, yet do when
severe economic conditions make them. In addition, he states
that migrants have preferred distinations within the United
States determined by their work skills and wage scales.
South Texas, because of its low wages and few non-agricul-
tural employment opportunities provides few incentives to
migrants. The chapter concludes with a discussion of
current policy proposals aimed at curtailing immigration
and criticisms of those policies' limitations. Although
the immigration problem is complex and no one solution
appears likely, the probable answer lies in between creating
employment opportunities for migrants in Mexico and mini-
mizing the adverse effects of illegal immigration in par-
ticular industries and occupations. In chapter* 7, we consider
a community-controlled development strategy that attempts
to create a cohesive community in which employers show
hiring preferences to fellow commuhity members
instead of illegal migrants and commuters,
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Chapter 6
THE RATIONALE BEHIND DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE
In this chapter, the rationale for federal investment in
lagging regions is discussed. The devaluation's impact on the
area makes such an analysis necessary because its adverse
effects on business have been depressing to the region's
economic growth. Development strategies presently in use con-
tain limitations in their potential for developing the area,
and in light of the devaluation it is even more important to
understand the rationale behind these theories and their in-
adequacies.
In the analysis of the rationale behind federal invest-
ment in South Texas, the study first centers on the Economic
Development Administration (EDA) and its public works strategy
for development. A brief history of the agency's legal status
is included, as well as several examples of the type of loans
and grants it has previously approved within the lower Rio
Grande Development region. Following these examples, the analy-
sis reviews the arguments for and against the present theories
of federal assistance to depressed areas: the theory of
planned adjustment and the theory of national demand. The
analysis then proceeds to a discussion of several policy
strategies that have developed from these general theories:
the growth center strategy and human resource development
strategy. The difficulties inherent in the employment of the
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above approaches concludes the discussion.
The Economic Development Administration (EDA)
Under the Public Works and Economic Development Act of
1965 and its amended form since then, the Econcmic Development
Administration was established. EDA's expressed function has
been to assist in the development of distressed regions of the
United States. EDA assistance is designed to aid eligible
organizations, such as redevelopment areas (counties, labor
areas, and cities of 250,000), economic development districts
(multi-county organizations with at least two distressed areas
and a redevelopment center which are centers of economic
activity), and economic development regions (multi-state
regions with joint federal-state commissions carrying out long-
range economic planning). Eligibility for these geographic
areas is determined by both high unemployment rates over
extended periods of time, and low median family incomes relative
to the national median income average.
The Public Works Act of 1965 authorized the Economic
Development Administration to provide grants and loans for the
following purposes:
1. to acquire, develop, and make improvements in
land for public works, public service, or de-
velopment facilities; and to acquire, contract,
rehabilitate, alter, expand, or improve such
facilities, including related machinery and
equipment;
2. to acquire technical assistance, research, and
information that includes project planning and
feasibility studies, management, and operational
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assistance and studies evaluating the needs of
and development potential for the economic
growth of each area. 108
A few examples of the type of loans and grants approved within
the Lower Rio Grande Development District are:
a. a $763,200 grant to the Cameron County Water
District for the rehabilitation of a water facility;
b. a $618,000 grant to the city of Weslaco for the
construction of an industrial park;
c. a $420,000 grant and $252,000 loan to the city of
McAllen for the construction of trade zone
facilities;
d. a $104,800 grant to the Raymondville Fire Station
for the construction of a community building. 109
It is this type of financial assistance that raises
questions concerning the effectiveness and appropriateness of
this strategy in South Texas. This chapter takes up that
discussion.
Public Wor-ks projects funded by the Economic Development
Administration are coordinated by the Lower Rio Grande Develop-
ment Council. As required by legislation, an Overall Economic
Development Program (OEDP) is first designed. This document
analyzes each district's development problems, proposes
actions, and lists project priorities such as constructing
industrial parks, oil docks, and a water storage reservoir in
McAllen. At EDA's discretion, grants and business loans are
provided to those projects having goals consistent with the
district's overall economic development program. There is a
rationale behind EDA's involvement and therefore, the under-
lying assumptions behind this planned development strategy
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deserve mention.
Development Theories
There are two extreme viewpoints on the proper strategy
for national development: the national demand theory and the
planned adjustment theory. In addition to these two theories,
as Cameron points out, there are a number of options open
between these two extreme theories that could form alternative
choices for national involvement.1 1 0
It becomes especially important to take up a discussion
of the rational behind federal involvement in development
matters because of the impact of devaluation. Such a discussion
helps to point out the implicit assumptions behind the arguments
both for and against federal aid to South Texas, arguments
especially important to understand in light of new demands for
federal assistance to South Texas businesses suffering from
the devaluation's effects. Because the devaluation has created
a depressing effect on the South Texas border economy, it is
relevant to see how conflicting sides would explain the
rationale for assisting the area during the adjustment period.
Therefore, each theory will be defined, policy strategies sug-
gested by each theory mentioned, and the limitations of these
policy strategies discussed.
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National Demand Theory
The theory of national demand argues that competitive
market forces will create an optimal spatial distribution of
economic activity. When any area shows symptoms of recession,
the theory claims, these economic signs should be interpreted
as a warning of the region's lessening importance to the
nation. Moreover, according to the theory, local employment
and low incomes should then attract new investors eager to
take advantage of the profit opportunities offered by low-cost
factors of production. If new investment fails to occur be-
cause the region has additional competitive disadvantages, the
unemployed would migrate to areas of greater opportunities.1 1 1
This thinking is carried to more sophisticated levels during
a private firm's location-decision process. One analytical
approach, defined by the theory of comparative cost, is taken
up below.
Very simply, the theory of comparative cost states that
industry will locate in a particular region, minimizing costs,
after examining the differences in operational costs arising
from price differences in labor, fuel, and other items
associated with a particular geographic region.
For example, some firms locate in a particular region
because their raw material inputs are found there. Some firms
locate in a particular area because the cost of distributing
their product is the most important aspect of deciding upon a
site. Economists label such industries as market-oriented.
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The third set of locational preferences-consists of industries
who select location on the basis of the other industries also
located there. Economists describe this situation as economies
of agglomeration. Economies of agglomeration are realized
when one firm locates in the proximity of other firms that
provide the locating firm with expenditure or cost savings.
The rationale behind EDA's investment in lagging regions
is based on the assumption that these regions contain potential
sites for successful enterprises. The strategy assumes that
some firms face diseconomies of scale when located in congested
urban areas and that operational costs could be reduced by
locating in an economically depressed region. But these
assumptions do not take into consideration some other important
factors.
As Hansen points out:
Whatever advantages rural areas may have in terms
of a stable labor force that is relatively cheap
and plentiful, of adequate and relatively cheap
land and of easy access to work and recreational
areas, they still have a host of disadvantages to
overcome. The cheap land and low tax rates may be
more than offset by low levels of services. There
are relatively few business contacts with other
producers or auxilliary services. Labor may be
plentiful, but it may prove costly to adapt the
relatively untrained labor force to the firm's
needs. The local market will probably not be
significant and frequently firms find it advantageous
to locate near competitors.1 1 2
The South Texas region exhibits many of the characteristics
that Hansen points out. In addition, these problems are com-
pounded by the predominant Chicano population who bring to the
situation the added difficulties associated with a language
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barrier. In this situation, those who agree with the theory
of national demand would say that the area's type of economy
is to be expected.
Planned Adjustment Theory
A conflicting national development theory that argues for
federal assistance to lagging areas is the theory of planned
adjustment. Planned adjustment theorists argue that market
forces do not and cannot be depended upon to create an optimal
spatial distribution of economic activity. Lagging regions,
according to planned adjustment theorists, suffer not only
from misutilization of funds and resources, but also because
entrepreneurs and outside investors are unaware of the favor-,
able opportunities that may exist within these regions.l1 3
These theorists additionally claim that such deficiencies can
be overcome by planning and investment in the lagging regions.
Some key assumptions produce this thinking: lagging areas
cannot overcome their structural difficulties because of
capital shortages caused by the tendency of capital to flow
into metropolitan areas, with their increased economic activity.
Potential profitability in the depressed areas does exist for
certain types of firms. The theory assumes that some firms
might be able to reduce their operational costs by moving away
from the diseconomies of scale created in congested metro-
politan areas. Another assumption is that some "public
purpose" is accomplished, e.g., maintaining a population in a
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declining area.114
Although such broadbased assumptions underlie federal
involvement in the development process, EDA is distinguished
from other federal agencies by its efforts to generate an
economic development process in specific areas of the country,
thus defining its spatial focus in advance.
EDA's job creation strategy deserves some criticism as to
its applicability in South Texas and the border area. Little
empirical evidence exists to argue against the strategy's
success in South Texas. On the contrary, the Lower Rio Grande
Development Council's report of the 1976 Overall Economic
Development Plan provides little evidence to prove the program
is not cost efficient. (The 1976 Overall Economic Development
Plan presented by the Lower Rio Grande Development Council
reported total investment by EDA and local sources at approxi-
mately $26.5 million for the region during 1967-76. This in-
vestment reportedly generated 14,278 primary jobs. At this
number, the cost of investment per job is $1,849. However, it
must be remembered that the employment estimates are derived
by local project sponsors.)115
Because of the lack of empirical data for the area, it
is necessary to evaluate EDA public works programs on the basis
of the appropriateness of its assumptions in rural areas. In
this regard, the theory can be evaluated from two alternative
policy strategies: growth center strategy and investment in
human capital strategy.
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The growth center approach represents an attempt to
encourage local production and expansion in rapidly growing
areas so as to spread growth to. other parts of the region. As
such the policy becomes one of spatial selectivity, with prime
consideration given to growth areas for the purpose of
large-scale public investment. This theory is an extension
of the theory of planned adjustment, the major differences
being that growth center proponents claim explicit criteria
for such regions.
Berry claims the population for viable growth is 50,000
to 250,000. ftansen sees medium-sized cities of 250,000 to
750,000 as more ideally suited, selected on the basis of
commuting and migration data.(116 )
The political implications of such a strategy must be
considered. Although the growth center strategy assumes
migration wil take place from rural to urban areas, it leaves
unanswered the question of what effects such migration could
have on smaller rural areas. Assuming the more mobile
population groups would migrate, i.e., the young and healthy,
it fails to provide an explanation for what happens to non-
migrating individuals.Secondly, the theory addresses neither
the appropriate rate of migration and its possible controls
nor the serious problems raised by a too rapid growth.
In addition, the growth center strategy does not adequately
address the cost of migration both to the individual and to
the nation. For the individual, significant private costs
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will be incurred from transportation expenses to the
relocation site and from income loss while moving. For the
nation, opportunity costs from underutilized land in the sending
area are incurred,as well as costs from congestion, replace-
ment and expansion in the receiving areas.
Politically, it seems inconceivable elected officials
would agree to a large number of their constituents migrating
from their district. And, if stringent criteria were applied,
such as Berry and Hansen propose, the number of eligible
growth centers becomes limited. Such action might give a
bias to certain regions of the country. For those located
in stagnant or declining areas, the strategy becomes
politically unattractive.
In South Texas, the growth center strategy runs into
difficulty because no growth region is clearly defined.
Secondly, since the growth denter theory operates under
the same assumptions, the appropriateness of those
assumptions must be examined in order to determine if there are
operating cost advantages. The region does contain cheap
labor, inexpensive land, and an unemployed labor force-,
But, again, the disadvantages are also numerous; poor
transportation routes, cultural and language- barriers, and
limited water resources.
Finally, with the implementation of a growth center,
the incentives of migration would be as great for Mexican
nationals to move into the area as for rural migrants.
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The question that remains is which firms will take
advantage of these incentives and relocate in rural areas.
Hansen examines the urban-to-rural shift of industry:
Those industries that have tended to leave
metropolitan areas have been characterized
by relative stagnation or decline; they
frequently seek cheap labor in areas of
surplus agricultural population. (117)
Other types of industry attracted to rural areas are
typically textiles, food and food processing, low-fashion
apparel, wood products, and furniture. In general, industries
attracted to rural areas seem to usually be low-wage, labor-
intensive industries. (118) In South Texas, this is evidenced
by manufacturers' participating in the'Mexican Border Industrial
Program.
In assessing South Texas' development potential from the
viewpoint of location, it can be shown that the area has few
primary resources except those related to the production of
agricultural goods. Wages are low, but generally the skills
of the labor force are those suited to the agricultural industry.
Hence, training can become a high short-term cost for new
industry relative to other areas.
Market-oriented firms have some incentives for locating in
South Texas because of its proximity to the Mexican market.
However, other trade-offs these firms must take into account
are the area population's low incomes, the small local market,
and the uncertainty of Mexico's import policy.
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It becomes apparent that migration from Mexico and the
development of South Texas border area cannot be disassociated.
Present rural development strategies can also be evalauted
from the theory of investment in human resources, e.g., education
and training in assisting individuals to improve their status,
income, and productivity. In economic development, private
industry locates these trained individuals and employs them.
Benefits accrue to the individual,the firm, and to society
as a whole, in the form of private income, profits, and taxes.
However, difficulties are present in implementing human
resource development programs in rural areas. For one
education and training increases the chances of migration from
rural areas to other areas with greater employment opportuni-
ties. Not only are the trained individuals lost, but with
them, the scarce resources used in their training. The se-
quencing of these human capital investments also poses a prob-
lem.
Three potential difficulties are postulated. As stated
earlier, a situation could arise in which a training and
education program would be completed before employment oppor-
tunities become available; thus increasing the probability
of migration by the newly trained workers. Second, an indus-
try could be attracted to an area before a work force matched
to its needs was created. If anything, EDA's investment in
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rural areas has shown the inadequacies of education programs
and the problems of the labor force adapting its skills to
certain industries. Third, there is a need to maintain a
trained labor force with an alternative, temporary employment
while an industry is considering relocation. None of these
situations are ideal.
The "start-up" industry training concept is one proposed
solution to the problem stated above. Seen as a better way to
match workers and jobs, the start-up concept attempts to
"leapfrog" the industrial development process by upgrading
local work forces in order to attract higher-wage industry
to an area. Ll This concept attempts to increase the wages
of low-income workers and attack some of the time lag and
sequencing difficulties in training and locating industry
by simultaneously training workers, in advance, for specific
jobs.
An analysis of these type of programs in South Carolina,
North Carolina, Virginia, and Alabama found that although the
concept had potential, the results depended a great deal on the
way the projects were operated. Those projects examined had
been more concerned with the interests of the relocating
firms, than with the marginal impacts in upgrading work forces.120)
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Summary
The devaluation's depressing impact on the economic
growth of South Texas makes necessary a re-examination
of the Economic Development Administration's development
assistance presently available to the area, In examining the
rationale behind federal investment in depressed regions,
particularly South Texas, this analysis has shown the ar-
guments both for and against federal involvement in the
area. We examined these conflicting viewpoints as expressed
in the theories of planned adjustment and national demand.
Particular attention was given to the policy strategies
these theories have developed: the growth-center strategy
,and the human resource development straltegy. These policy
strategies have limitations, as was shown by reviewing the
subject literature and the characterististics of the area,
The area has few primary inputs attractive to relocating
industrial firms. For market-oriented firms, the primary
market of low-income workers is small, while the secondary
markets in Mexico are tenuous. Investment in South Texas
growth areas, with emphasis on rural-to-urban migration,
does not take into account the proximity of Mexico and rural
migration from that country.
Investment in human resources will be further hampered
by the devaluation's effects of increased unemployment and
operating difficulties for retail establishments located
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there. Such investment must additionally confront the problems
in rural areas of time lags for locating industry and their
precipitation of emigration. In South Texas, the problems
of a language barrier and different cultural attitudes still
exist,
The devaluation increases the areals need for effective
development strategies, While EDA's present development stra-
tegy in the area deserves criticism, there is a role for an
agency of its resources; In chapter 7, alternative strategies
are presented dealing with the agriculture industry, local
governments, and rural organizations. EDA assistance in these
efforts is discussed,
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CHAPTER SEVEN
ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES FOR SOUTH TEXAS
There is a basic theme throughout this chapter and
this theme should be made clear. Long-term economic develop-
ment in depressed rural areas cannot take place successfully
unless some organization or movement generates pressure on
political bodies by making vocal the problems of rural areas.
Although McAllen and Brownsville are classified as
gtandard metropolitan statistical areas, the region is
primarily a rural area and urban development policies would
be inappropriately matched to its needs. Therefore, the
development strategies presented here will take into consid-
eration the rural characteristics of the region. They are
not presented solely for their possible impact in creating
employment and increasing incomes, but also for their po-
tential political impact on important policy issues concerning
the area,
The discussion in chapter 6 pointed out the difficulties
with present development strategies As was also mentioned,
the inadequacies of these development strategies is especially
critical in light of the devaluation's depressing effect
on the economy of South Texas. Therefore, it seems obvious
that new development strategies must be developed in order
to deal not anly with the problems previously unsolved
by present strategies, but also to ease the additional
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depressing impact of the devaluation. For this reason,
major consideration is given to the role three important
elements of the economy, the agriculture industry, local
governments, and rural organizations, might play in the
area's economic development.
This chapter will briefly outline the possibilities of
using the region's own resources as opposed to the previously
attempted federal assistance. Even though a fully elaborated
development program statement was outside the scope of the
thesis, this short description of alternative strategies
indicates possible directions for the future of the region.
To begin, the study examined the South Texas agriculture
industry. A brief explanation is given of the modernization
that has occurred in the industry in recent years and its
effect on the rural labor force. Following this background
information, the chapter explores the possibility of rationali-
zing the work done by the agriculture industry while also
discussing the potential problems and benefits of such a
move, Considered briefly is the role EDA and other federal
agencies can play by providing technical assistance and
research funding for the agriculture industry,
Another alternative source for development assistance
is local government, In this section, the two resources for
promoting an area's economic development that local govern-
ments possess are discussed. The study first centers on
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the local government's role in public employment programs
by explaining the legislative background of past efforts
and their objectives. Criticism and support of these efforts
is included; the problems specifically encountered by
public employment efforts are discussed. Second, the govern-
ment's ability to act as a consumer of products and services
produced locally by developing enterprises and to thereby
provide financial support for such enterprises, is also
mentioned. Finally, the chapter examines two types of rural
organizations that offer the potential for initiating
significant changes in the community: community development
corporations and cooperatives. The chapter concludes with
the benefits these organizations could create for their
community; but their potential problems are also outlined.
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Agriculture Industry
The agriculture industry in South Texas, like the agriculture
industry in the nation, has undergone significant changes
in the last twenty years. For one, agricultural output has
risen moderately with substitution of mechanized equipment,
fertilizers, and scientific farm management for a portion
of the labor force. Regions that once supported large agri-
cultural populations have suffered as a result of these changes.
Different activities demanding different skills reduced the de-
mand for rural workers trained in more labor-intensive methods.
Change did create demand for new skills, but the lack of
training and education, worker attitudes, and the urban location
of some jobs prevented all workers from benefiting. Instead,
with the increasing substitution of capital for labor, the main-
tenance of smaller rural labor forces became the trend.(12U
This section examines the possibility of rationalizing
seasonal work in the agriculture industry; a systematic proce-
dure in which work activities are identified and distributed
over time in order to maintain a regular work force with minimal
employee turnover, for a sustained period of time. The proce-
dure might include training employees for a mix of activities
and responsibilities in order to increase the length of employ-
ment. It might also include improving the efficiency of operating
methods within the industry, i.e., harvesting, crop selection,
marketing, etc. The value of such a procedure will be examined.
As reported in Table 3, a large percentage of the em-
ployed agricultural labor force is seasonal. The agricultural
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industry has seldom seen the need to employ a permanent labor
force. This belief resulted because activities requiring large
amounts of labor are obviously seasonal and coincide with peri-
ods of land preparation, planting,.and harvesting. Additionally,
because of the large labor force in the area, agri-business has
usually negotiated with the farm labor contractors who pro-
vide farm labor crews. Unfortunately, this system of employment
provides few incentives to continue working for one employer,
since the farmworker is neither paid directly by the employer nor
assured of stable employment. Short-term hiring has fueled
migration from the area, and in recent years, the agriculture
industry itself has incurred substantial losses because of its
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unstable work force.
Structural roadblocks obstructing the formation of regu-
lar work forces are inherent in the Valley's agriculture industry.
For example, heavy rains often do not allow -harvesting operations
to take place because trucks cannot operate in the muddy fields. (23)
In two of the last three years, the Valley's citrus industry
experienced such slowdowns. which resulted both in fruit spoilage
and delivery delays.(124) Financial losses occurred not only
for the industry, but for the unemployed farmworkers as well.
Several proposed changes could benefit both farmworkers and
the industry. All however, are dependent on the industry's
attempt to lengthen the worker's term of employment, which,
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in recent years has decreased. (125)
Proposed changes are as follows:
1. If industry could maintain a regular payrolled
work force, migrant flows from the area might
be stabilized, thereby resulting in longer
work periods, higher yearly incomes, and extended
periods of schooling for the workers' children.
2. Industry might institute ratings of workers'
performances; by tying performance to a wage
scale, workers could proceed in varying degrees
of work effort knowing that increased output
would be rewarded. Industry would benefit
because jobs within the industry would become
more attractive. In addition, higher wages
might ihcrease the availability of a resident
work force.
3. To lengthen employment periods, the acreage in
labor-intensive crops could be increased. Length-
ening land preparation, planting, and harvesting
periods, and/or training workers to perform
a wider range of farming activities could
also achieve a longer term of employment.
4. Structural problems must also be examined and
corrected in the industry. Widening field roads,
i-mproving their grade, and modernizing farm implem-
ents are only a few suggestions that may make
possible avoiding costly periods of inactivity.
These proposed actions are based upon the feelings of
some industry officials and recent research findings conducted
in this area. Some general assumptions these people agree upon
are:
1. Farm labor is underutilized and mismanaged.
2. Migrant farmworkers would prefer a less nomadic
lifestyle if employment were available, and thefe
were less competition from alien labor.
3. Farm labor contractors are not needed to recruit
a farm labor force. Industry can do it
more efficiently.
4. Operational and structural obstacles exist in the
agricultural industry.
If there is a major role the Economic Development
Administration and Department of Agriculture can play in
development, it is certainly within the agriculture industry.
For one, both can finance research into new methods of
labor-intensive farming, crop selection, and determining the
proper scale for different farming activities, as well as
providing simple consumer information. Secondly, EDA can
finance technical assistance programs. These funds can be used
to assist small farmers, cooperatives, and community development
groups in marketing, accounting, and other problems related to
farming activities. And finally, EDA can provide low-interest
business loans to partially finance machinery or infrastructure
within the industry, so as to allow for more labor-intensive
activities.
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
Local governments, both at the city and county level, offer
many potentiAl contributions to the development efforts. Local
governments are eligible for federal grants that could be used
for developmental purposes. In addition, government consumes
products and services while providing services to the area.
During the process, government creates market and employment
opportunities. In this section, these two resources that local
governments possess are discussed. Attention is first focused
on Public Employment Programs, followed by a discussion
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on the use of government markets by local organizations in
developing enterprises.
Public Employment Programs
In the early 1960's, only two public institutions
existed for administration of employment programs at the local
level; the public schools and the federally funded, state-
( 126 ) Anoalchneocrd
operated, employment services. A notable change occurred
when additional services were provided for those individuals
who found it difficult to compete in the labor market. Some
of the legislative acts creating these public employment
and training programs were:
1. In 1962, the Manpower Development and Training Act
was passed. The Act focused on providing training
for experienced workers who were unemployed because
of changes in technology or slowdowns in the
economy.
2. Noting the need for public employment programs
targeted at the unskilled and disadvantaged, the
Economic Opportunity Act was passed in 1964. Pro-
grams created under this Act were: the Neighborhood
Youth Corps and Job Corps, both aimed at employing
disadvantaged young people; New Careers, devised
for training poor people as paraprofessionals in
health, education, and public safety; the Work
Incentive Program (WIN), an effort to get welfare
recipients into the labor force; and others.
3. In 1971, Congress passed the Emergency-Employment
Act, which created the Public Employment Program (PEP).
Unlike other employment programs, PEP enrollees were
not typically disadvantaged workers, despite the fact
that the orginal legislation specified employing
disadvantaged workers and minorities.
4. In 1973, the Comprehensive Employment and Training
Act (CETA) led employment into a phase of development.
Thus far, CETA has attempted to combine the goals
of reducing cyclical and structural employment as
well as improving the earnings potential of low
skilled workers.
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Few programs have changed objectives and functions as
rapidly as public service employment programs. Such changes
resulted from program inadequacies, operational difficulties,
and program criticisms. General criticism will now be discussed.
A major argument made against public employment programs
has been that state and local governments have a limited
capacity to absorb or supervise extra workers. Thus, local
control over employment slots could provide a means to displace
regular employees. Displacement could occur through local
governments failing to replace regular personnel or finance
regular jobs during periods of fiscal need, as in fact was
27
reported to be the case during CETA and PEP evaluations.
Because of this, critics of public service employment
argue the program's operation should be federally controlled,
specifically targeted to the disadvantaged, or restricted
in its uses. 28 Proponents of the program claim that to place
restrictions on the program would reduce creative attempts to
implement the program, while federal control would increase the
start-up time of ventures. Instead, they claim local control
will allow officials to establish their priorities and thus make
the program effective.: 29 )
A third criticism voiced is the potential of public
service employment for inflationary impact on local economies.
Opponents argue the program participants produce few services
of value, while increasing demand for goods and services with
their increased purchasing power. These critics implicitly
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assume that the jobs created by the program are of make-work
variety with few skills required and little output expected. (130)
Proponents argue that public employment is not a case of
make-work jobs, but can provide valuable services
to communities that lack the funds to finance needed projects.
In addition, they state that many objectives can be accomplished
through this temporary employment, such as improving worker
attitudes and providing relevant work experience and training
These are a few of the general questions that spark
discussion about the use of public employment funds. Below,
an evaluation of the Public Employment Program in South Texas
is discussed.
Public Employment in South Texas
In 1972, an assessment of the first 9eat of operation.
of the Emergency Employment Act of 1971 in Texas was performed
and later submitted as a report to the National Manpower Task
Force.(131) In the report is found a patticular evaluation
of the Public Employment Program in South Texas. Although
some of the problems raised were related to the objectives
of PEP, some general issues raised will also concern the
operation of CETA, i.e., the minimum wage question,'the shortage
of funds in rural areas, and the program's orientation.
The question of minimum wage created a problem with
many of the PEP participants and employing agents in South Texas.
Objections were raised by these groups because PEP participants
were limited to those occupations in which the prevailing wage
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. the federal minimum wage ($1.60 per hour at the time) (132)
Subsequently, new job titles were created so that those PEP participants,
employed with permanent workers who were paid less than the federal
minimum wage could remain. Hard feelings arose around this issue as
employing agents viewed PEP as beccming a wedge to increase the
wages of other workers. (33)
Another problem pointed out was the lack of funds to make the
program attractive. As Briggs wrote in the evaluation:
Making the Public Employment Program (PEP) more
responsive in Texas is hampered by the inflexible
federal restrictions and by the paltry sum that
makes PEP unattractive to many local units of
government (e.g., 77 rural counties did not want
PEP funds [in Texas]). As it is, the paltry sums
available for rural employment needs in Texas are
too small to be meaningful. PEP is spread too thin
over the vast area that is rural Texas. 134
Another drawback with the programs in South Texas was the local
direction and orientation given to the program as Briggs points out again:
Programs oriented to the migrant fanrorker have not
worked. A problem is that the operators of (PEP)
believe that migrant farmworkers do not have any skills
to offer the labor market. Hence, PEP migrant participants will
be assigned as helpers to work with skilled craftsmen. No
specific training is involved. Pather it is hoped that the
helpers will pick up enough skill knowledge while working
on the job to qualify for a more permanent job in subsequent
years. (134
These problems describe the difficulty of using available program
funds in an effective manner. In addition to these problems, the small
amount of political power that the: area has relative to urban areas
and the strong opposition to change held by local officials, make it even
More difficult to implement programs effectively. Nevertheless, the need for
public employment programs still remain.
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Briefly, there are important uses for public employment programs
in rural areas. Most importantly, the program guarantees a means of
providing employment in rural areas. Used selectively, the program
additionally serves as an organizing tool for community groups, a
training mechanism for local government officials, and a method of pro-
viding much-needed services, (health and nutritional couseling, housing
rehab, day-care services, etc.). Moreover by reducing payroll expenditures
it offers private and non-profit organizations, such as comunity
development corporations and cooperatives, additional working capital.
In a start-up situation, this subsidy could be crucial for it reduces
the period of achieving a breakeven point, the point in time when business
costs equal revenue.
Local Government Revenues.
As mentioned in the introduction to the chapter, local governments
consume many products and services fram within the area. The expenditures
of financial resources for these services are substantial. In McAllen,
the total operating budget excluding bond retirement and capital
investment was $5.2 million for the 1975 fiscal year. ( 3 ) The amount
of these funds suggests the strategy of drawing local gcvernments into
contracts with community organizations for the provision of services.
The concept is not an original one; but the lessons lea-ned from past
efforts, especially the Small Business Administration 8 'a) program
should be noted.
This program assists minority and disadvantaged persons to obtain
non-competitive negotiated contracts fram various federal agencies. How-
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ever, a recent program evaluation reported that SBA's success in helping
disadvantaged firms to become self-sufficient and campetitive was minimal. (137)
The two important reasons cited were:
1. Procurement contracts were made to firms who had
little chance of ever being able to compete in
an unprotected market.
2. Procurement contracts were awarded without assurance
of other types of financial or management assistance.
Some of these program shortcomings can be minimized by coordin-
ating efforts with other technical assistance programs, such as the Small
Business Administration 406 program, Title III of the Public Works Act,
and OMBE Local Business Development Organizations..
RUPAL ORGANIZATIONS
A major problem of low-income groups, agricultural workers, and
Chicanos in South Texas has been their inability to generate significant
political pressure to alter certain public policies. This weakness has
produced certain interest groups who attempt to control local policies.
In South Texas, agriculture and ranching groups have dominated policy
decisions especially in regard to the comnuter and illegal alien issues.
In this section, two organizations that offer
the potential to initiate significant changes in public policy with
respect to agriculture, economic development, education, employment, and
welfare are presented. The two are comunity development corporations and
cooperatives.
Coumunity Development Corporations (CDCs)
The objectives of Community Development Corporations (CDCs) are
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generally stated as that of establishing institutions that *allow the workers
in the community to revitalize the economic, social, and political life
of the area. The structure of the CDC' s can be on a profit or non-profit
status. There are advantages and disadvantages to each model with respect
to tax structures, political involvement, and the use of profits, however
both have similar objectives and functions.
Though CDC's have a range of economic uses such as developing
incame-producing business firms, upgrading the labor force by providing
training and educational opportunities, increasing the possibilities of
better housing, and delivering a higher level of human services, it can
also form the basis for initiating political activity and change. This
non-economic function is an important aspect of this type of cammunity
action. As the comunity begins to examine the policies that have in-
fluenced its development, their actions become rore than an economic
undertaking; the CDC becomes the base of political activity.
A major problem faced by conmunity development efforts has been
the lack of equity capital available to these groups. for the purpose of
initiating local enterprises. Initially, federal funds from the Office
of Economic Opportunity (OEO) provided financing for many ventures. In
recent years, beginning with the demise of OEO and influenced by the
disappointing results of some conmunity development efforts, government
support for the concept has waned.
At a time when resources are declining, conmunity development
advocates claim project selection criteria become more crucial than before
in sustaining such efforts. Although it is generally conceded that capital-
intensive industries are desired in the long-run, most community development
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project selections are not faced with that choice because of scarce
capital resources. But project selection for CDC involves many other
factors; the type of product or service, the scale of activity, the
product's particular market (export vs. local) and labor force mix, etc.
These considerations involve important trade-offs, and to a large extent
determine the amount of community support the project will have. Thus,
the analysis and packaging of the enterprise have a great influence
on the enterprise succeeding.
There are many benefits to be found in a community planned
development strategy. For one, there are economic benefits, such as
the training and educational opportunities provided by the activities of
the enterprise. More important, however, are the non-economic advantages
that will have significant long-run beneficial implication s. These could
be the political base established by the development actions or it might
be reflected in the attention brought to rural problems, such as the lack
of health and welfare services, educational programs and unfair business
practices. This political base could generate pressures for improving these
services. And finally, it should not be discounted that some of the
enterprises established could be profitable, forming the basis for a long-
term economic development effort.
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OOOPERATIVES
Another organization that has proved successful in representing
groups -while at the same time providing particular services to its members
is the cooperative. In many ways, cooperatives operate much like a
business firm. However, there are definite distinctions between the two.
One, cooperatives are owned by the entire membership, unlike
stock ownership plans, proprietorships, or partnerships. Two, cooperatives
are not profit-motivated, rather all revenues that the cooperative brings
in, above costs, are returned to members in proportion to what that member
buys. This refund allows the coop member to save on many products or
services provided by the cooperative.
A third difference is that cooperative nembership is voluntary.
The cooperative organization's primary purpose is to help members realize
higher incames by providing a product or service more efficiently,
dependably, at a lower cost, and at a higher quality than those provided
elsewhere.
Cooperative objectives are much like those espoused by advocates
of community economic developient. For example- while ccrmmunity
development advocates argue for ccrmunity- control through local ownership
of enterprises, cooperative adtivities imply that the enterprises a-
round the area are not meeting the wants and preferences of the cammunity
at a reasonable cost. Furthermore, the service provided by these enterprises
can be duplicated by the cooperative membership.
A significant part of the history of the cooperative movement
in the rural United States reaches back to attempts during the late 1930's
and early 1940's to establish cooperatives in rural areas by the Farm Security
Administration. These past attempts faced opposition from a large
number of groups, such as the U.S.D.A. extension service, state extension
services, state land agricultural colleges, county agents, private farm
machinery and supply companies, large southern corporations, established
cooperatives, and special interest groups representing agriculture
industry. (L38) These groups considered rural cooperatives threats to their
economic and political power. (139)
Mat Cooperatives Offer
Cooperatives offer ccnmunity groups an organization with the poten-
tial to influence policy as it concerns the issue of rural poverty.
Cooperatives provide activities that may increase members' incomes,
stimulate their participation in political affairs, and allow the members
to acquire many skills and work experience in management, marketing,
and other activities. Hence, cooperative organizations, like CDCs, begin
to increase the employment options of the rural poor.
Problems Faced by Cooperatives
Many of the problems that plague conmunity development corporations
also trouble cooperatives. Little equity capital, low credit supplies,
and few management and marketing skills still pose critical problems
to the success of cooperative operations. Some government programs that
could be helpful in, alleviating some of these problems have already been
discussed; public employment programs, government contracts, and technical
assistance from a number of organizations like the Small Business Administration
the Office of Minority Business Enterprise, and the Economic Development
Administration.
115
Summary
In this chapter, alternative development strategies have
been discussed and their rationale supplied, Particular atten-
tion has been paid to the role the agriculture industry, local
governments, and community groups might play.
The agriculture industry in recent years has incurred
financial losses due to poor weather, that often reduced field
activity, and an unstable labor force. This chapter presents
the rationale for industry and federal investment in structur-
al and operational improvements in the agriculture industry.
The case is made that by training the labor force for a mix of
activities, lengthening periods of employment, and introducing
measures of productivity; agricultural jobs might become more
attractive to the worker. Hence, this might increase the chance
for extended periods of employment.
Also pointed out is the need for investment in an infra-
structure related to agricultural processes and work equipment.
This investment might make harvesting, land preparation, and
planting more efficient and help reduce periods of inactivity.
Local governments are shown to have two valuable resources
for aiding the development of new enterprises. These resources
are public employment funds and municipal revenues. It is
pointed out that if these funds are used selectively, some
community enterprises can be sustained through municipal/gov-
ernment subcontracts and by subsidizing their payroll accounts
with CETA slots.
The final section of the chapter directs itself to the issue
of underrepresentation of rural groups. Two organizations
discussed are community development organizations and cooperatives.
The usefulness of these organizations as lobbying groups as
well as their potential for providing training and relevant
work experience is pointed out.
The impact of the devaluation translates into complex
policy questions for decisionmakers in each of the above areas.
More agriculture workers than ever are now unemployed and any
future plans for efficient agricultural development will be
hampered by the need to absorb them into the labor force.
Local governments must now bear devaluation-caused losses
in addition to the costs of funding new enterprises. Finally,
rural groups must modify their organizing strategies to include
the devaluation's effects on their members.
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CONCLUSION
This study has had two objectives. First, the study
has examined the effects of the Mexican currency devaluation on
three specific sectors of the region's economy: the retail
sector, financial institutions, and two state-operated income
maintenance programs, the Texas Employment Commission's Unemploy-
ment Compensation Program, and the Texas Department of Public
Welfare's food stamp program. Second, in order to understand
the implications of the devaluation's impact on the development
of the region, we briefly examined the specific policy issues
raised by the impact: post-devaluation economic development
strategies, U.S. immigration as it concerns the commuter, and
illegal immigration from Mexico.
Chapter One explained the close association between U.S.
and Mexican border communities, and why an action of either
government would affect the communities on both sides of the
border.
Chapter Two analyzed the devaluation's effect on the
retail sector of McAllen and Brownsville. Data and interviews
documented the drop in sales for retail merchants following
the devaluation and their subsequent attempts to minimize losses
through sales, employment cutbacks, and cancelling orders.
Further, it was found that those merchants hurt most severely
by the devaluation, were those located within the downtown area
of Brownsville and McAllen (and thus most easily accessible to
Mexican shoppers), did not carry large merchandise selections,
nor were they affiliated with national chains. Most importantly,
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findings from the analysis show that retail businesses will
continue to minimize all costs, including personnel, for an
indefinite period. This suggests that federal assistance to
retail could not bring employment back to its levels prior to
the devaluation.
In Chapter Three the analysis focused on the devaluation's
impact on border financial institutions. Data documented the in-
crease in time deposits in commercial banks, both immediately
before and after the devaluation, a result of the capital inflow
produced by Mexican depositors attempting to protect their
cash holdings. Although commercial bank data were ambiguous,
savings and loan data gave a clearer indication of the devaluation's
impact on the economy. These data showed that significant drops
had occurred in deposits and new loans in the quarter period
following the devaluation. In addition to the bank data, inter-
views with bank officials provided insight into the reasons be-
hind post-devaluation bank policies. Officials stated that the
new deposits would be invested in securities in order to provide
adequate liguidity if the deposits were suddenly withdrawn, This
procedure indicates that the new deposits would not produce any
lon-term lending. Additionally, bank officials revealed they
follow more cautious lending policies. When questioned about
their perceptions of the area's development needs, it became
apparent they saw no role for their institutions in the development
process. However, the thesis concluded the chapter analysis by
mentioning a change in their investment methods which would aid
in the area development,
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Chapter Four examined the devaluation's impact on two
state-operated income maintenance programs, the Unemployment
Compensation program and the Food Stamp program. The analysis
showed that both programs had been affected by the devaluation
because of the employment cutbacks and shorter work weeks dis-
cussed in chapter two's examination of the retail sector.
Moreover, the program depicted a magnitude of program participation
that emphasizes the need for programs able to do more than
merely maintain large numbers of participants at low income levels.
Rather, the area needs programs that will provide participants with
the lasting benefits of education and training.
Part II of the thesis begins an examination of the major
policy issues raised. The issues raised by the devaluation not
only concern area economic issues, but also the broader issues of
illegal migration from Mexico. In reviewing several studies on
illegal migration from Mexico, one writer, Cornelius, suggested
that Mexican migrant agricultural workers prefer California to
Texas because of the higher wages in the industry there. Since
agricultural work is the primary source of employment along the
Lower Rio Grande Valley, this suggests that the impact of illegal
migration will be slight in this area.
It was also discussed that the commuter poses a more
serious employment threat than illegal aliens to US.
border labor force because of their legal status. However, a more
careful analysis requires more data, especially occupational
information. Given this information, the labor certification
process could become an effective mechanism for controlling
their entry.
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The devaluation has also produced questions on the ade-
quacy of federal development policies in the area. The study
examined this problem by reviewing the arguments both for and
against federal investment in depressed regions; the theories
of planned adjustment and national demand. Present EDA
public works strategy was criticized for not taking into account
many factors associated with rural areas that strongly influ-
ence a private firm's decision to locate within the area.
Problems pointed out were transportation costs, the few primary
inputs the area has to offer to industry, the low-skilled
and poorly educated labor force, and the cultural-language
differences found in South Texas.
The final chapter proposed alternative strategies that
deal with the limitations of the above strategies. Emphasis
is placed on making use of the resources 'that are available to
the area. Thus-, major consideration was given to the role the
agriculture industry, local governments, and rural organizations
might play in the area's development.
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APPENDIX 1
Excerpts from Echeverria's State of the Union
Message, September 1, 1976.
The need for making unprecedented efforts to obtain
funds to finance a public investment program in the basic
sectors of the national economy made it necessary to remodel
our policy with regard to taxes, public sector prices and rates,
domestic credit, and foreign borrowings. In the frame of this
finance strategy and in order to preserve a desirable climate of
calm and confidence in the face of international economic
unrest, the enormous effort of mobilizing domestic and foreign
savings made it essential to maintain the existing exchange
rate between the Mexican peso and the U.S. dollar.
Economic, fiscal, and financial policies were directed
toward capitalizing on confidence in the peso's internal
and external value to restructure the bases of our national
economy which could not have been accomplished at that time
with any other exchange rate.
Public investment climbed from 30 billion pesos in
1970 to over 100 billion pesos in 1975. In this administra-
tion, public investment for the first time surpassed private
investment.
... We substantially rechanneled the available supply
of domestic credit into strategic public sector projects
and made the greatest possible use of foreign credit allowed
us...[These economic] conditions and national committments
have inevitably exerted a decisive influence on production
costs and prices, restricting the country's production activ-
ity and competitivd potential. The current account deficit
in the balance remains high.
This deficit is not basically the result of inadequate
capacity to produce goods and services... The problem is that
rise in foreign market prices has been somewhat low in recent
years, whereas domestic costs and prices and those at which
we fix our export commodities have moved up at a fast pace,
thereby weakening our competitive position abroad. This curbs
our foreign sales possibilities and discourages tourism. Further
it encourages imports and the contraband of products that compete
with local industry and induces Mexicans to travel and spend
heavily abroad... We adopted several measures during this
administration to deal with our growing deficit, Exports have
been bolstered through a duty rebat mechanism and special
financing and guarentees. A massive institutional sales
promotion effort has been made in a great many countries.
Strict import controls were applied, but further tightening
would affect the supply of vital raw materials, equipment,
and machinery needed for industry, reduce employment, and
undermine endeavors for shared development.....
These measures, though highly beneficial to the
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economy did not sufficiently restore export dynamism, even
though our foreign markets began to show recovery, nor
were import values adequately adjusted and our balance of
tourism services continued to less than satisfactory...
The behavior of foreign trade flows, the relation
between our price levels and those abroad, verification of
a growing unused capacity in domestic factors of production
and the curbing effect this has on the generation of urgently
needed jobs led us to the conclusion that the Mexican peso's
current rate of exchange is unequal to the task of restoring our
balance of payments.
Knowledge of this situation encourages the flight
of frightened capital and depletes the uolume of domestic
savings needed to finance development...
The new exchange rate must be fixed, under conditions
of free convertibility, by real economic market forces
shaped by current national and international conditions. It
must be kept flexible for some time, allowing it to reach
the suitable level for correcting our balance of payments
deficit and dealing with speculative flight, without uselessly
sacraficing the country's goal, silver, and foreign currency.
To be sound, this new level must fulfill several basic
economic policy objectives: promote export growth of farm,
livestock, fishery, and mining products, manufacturing goods
and tourism services by making good use of Mexico's ample
production capacity; curtail the import of goods, including
contraband, that compete with local industry, and discourage
spending by Mexican abroad so that this foreign exchange
can be funneled into the creation of jobs at home; reduce
foreign borrowings, remove the distrust that triggers capital
flight and avert an excessive increase in domestic prices.
Regulated temporary flotation will be accompanied by
an economic and financial strategy, embodied in short-term
and long-term programs... The strategy is composed of the following
basic decisions;
1. To recover and preserve the competitive capacity
of our exports of goods and services, ensuring that
the rise domestic prices and costs is substantially
lower than the exchange rate adjustment.
2. To protect the purchasing power of low-income groups.
3. To prevent unwarranted profits.
4. To protect the financial soundness of business firms.
5. To control the public deficit.
6. To regulate credit expansion.
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APPENDIX II
METHODOLOGY
Because of the preliminary nature of this study, a
a major task involved identifying which information sources
could be utilized. Secondary data sources were the 1972
Texas Census of Retail Trade, the 1970 U.S. Census of Population,
the 1972 Census of Selected Service Industry, and the 1973
County Business Patterns. Relevant information was also provided
by the Texas Employment Commission, the Texas Comptrollers
Office of Public Accounts, the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas,
and the Texas Savings and Loan Department. These state and fed-
eral offices provided current labor force estimates, bank
deposit data, occupational information, savings and loan data,
etc. Newspapers and relevent periodicals were also used.
Upon completion of the secondary sources' data collection,
it was necessary to gather primary information
through interviews. The interviews served two functions.
First, they provided the study to gain insight into the
problems faced by those particular sectors of the economy
under study. In addition, the interviews allowed the study to
identify other sources of information. These included the
local Chamber of Commerce, the local B-oard of Realtors, the
Texas A & M Real Estate Research Center, the Texas Department
of Public Welfare, and local Retail Merchant Associations.
It should be stated that although some of the interviews
124
provided usable primary data, in most instances the interview
merely produced anecdotal and unofficial infornation.
Interview Format
The interviews used in this study occurred in McAllen,
Texas during the period of December 15, 1976 to Dec. 23, 1976.
McAllen was chosen for several reasons. First, local contacts
with business, financial institutions, government officials,
and the Mexican-American Center for Economic Development made
scheduling of the interviews easier. Second, since the McAllen
SMSA has greater employment in the retail-wholesale sector
than the Brownsville SMSA, it suggested the impact and its
effects might be more observable in McAllen. A third factor
was the close interaction of border communities following the
devaluation to the point of exhanging weekly on pedesttian
traffic flows, etc. Moreover, since the study focuses on the
business reaction following the devaluation and appropriate
policy responses, collecting data from disaggregated sources
placed pressures on other time usage. The data presented
for both the McAllen and Brownsville SMSA are for the sake
of comparison, but the author acknowledges their limitations.
Because of time limitations and the risk involved in
questinnaire responses, interviews were conducted in person.
Most of the questions directed at the interviewees concerned
the time sequence of events following the devaluation and
business reactions. A sample of the questions asked are:
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Could you outline the process that took place in the
retail sector after the devaluation? Please be
specific in the steps and specify the timeframe in
which these steps took place?
2., What are the long-term strategies that businesses
are-facing now that devaluation is several months
old?
3. Can you identify which occupatitional types have been
laid off? What was the prevailing wage in these
catagories?
4. Will you estimate how many workers were resident
workers and how many were Mexican nationals?
For financial officials, general questions asked were:
1. How did the capital flow from Mexico affect
your deposits?
2. What type of deposits were these?
3. Were these deposits of significant amounts to fianance
or invest?
4. How did the devaluation affect delinquencies?
5. What is the Bank's policy to Retail Merchants?
6. What is your primary concern in the short-term?
These were the general questions asked. However from discussions
that followed, other questions ussually did arise.
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APPENDIX III
McALLEN-PHARR-EDINBURG SMSA
EXPERIENCED WORKERS REGISTERED BY OCCUPATIONAL CODE
OCCUPATION 12/31/75 3/30/76 6/30/76 9/30/76
PROFESSIONAL,
TECHNICAL, &
MANAGERIAL
CLERICAL &
SALES
SERVICE
FARMING
PROCESS ING
OCCUPATIONS
MACHINE TRADES
BENCH TRADE
STRUCTURAL WORK
MISCELLANEOUS
608
1,419
1,235
2,463
1,284
398
389
2,064
3,181
574
1,380
1,221
2,674
1, 019
394
354
1,940
2,740
1,245 895
1,349 1,298
1,371 1, 28 9
1,739 1,495
810
313
329
964
314
342
1,425 1,397
2,489 2,579
1These figures do not include workers that are listed as entry-
level workers. Such workers are defined as individuals who
wish to enter another trade or who are trained but do not have
experience in the particular field.
Source: Texas Employment Commission, Occupational Information
on Registered Workers. Quarterly Reports. Austin, Texas.
December, 1976.
It is extremely diffiult to obtain accurate monthly
information on the occupations of the unemployed labor force.
This results from both the absence of required data and TEC's
reluctance to spend a great deal of time and effort collecting it.
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OCCUPATION
If the infornation were available, determining specific occupations
affected by the devaluation would be possible. TEC does collect occupational
information on its registered unemployed workers, but the number of registered
workers is reported only at the end of each quarter. Thus, if same workers
find employment without using the job placement services of the Commission
and/or employed between the two reporting periods, their numbers are carried
fram quarter to quarter without change.
Another prcblem with cata collection is the Comnissian's practice
of catagorizing registered workers under nore than ane occupational
code. The table in this appendix presents the occupational data collected
by TEC.
It might be added that the study did attempt to use these figures in
the analysis. It was hoped that since the devaluation occurred on August 31,
1976, the workers laid-off would be reflected in the third-quarter printing.
However, this type of analysis was not successful.
The only information available came fram local TEC interviews. Officials
related that a high number of workers did register in the sales and clerical
occupations.
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